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ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate R1218

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIES

DN 2/15/77

BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000011135

Wednesday, September 17, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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A

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF

James Angleton

PAGE

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EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT

FOR IDENTIFICATION

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STAFF INTERVIEW

Wednesday, September 17, 1975

United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to  
Governmental Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock  
p.m., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Paul Wallach and James Dick, Professional Staff  
Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Angleton, on behalf of the Committee,  
3 let me express our appreciation on the record for your coming  
4 back again. As you recall, I was present for a portion of the  
5 testimony that you gave to Mr. Johnson on the Houston Plan, and  
6 I still think for this session that the oath that was applied  
7 at that time would still pertain.

8 Do you understand that you are still under oath?

9 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. You know the regulations.

10 Mr. Wallach. In any event, you at that time were also  
11 given then, you were advised of your rights to counsel, etc.

12 I take it, once again, by the fact that you have come without  
13 counsel, that you have taken to waive that right.

14 Is that right?

15 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

16 Mr. Wallach. The subject matter that we'll be discussing  
17 here today primarily focuses upon the New York mail intercept  
18 program that was run by the CIA for approximately 20 years.

19 I realize you've already given some testimony on this,  
20 both for the record, for the Commission, and briefly touched upon  
21 it as a sidelight to Mr. Johnston's examination, and I will try as  
22 best I can not to be repetitive. I, of course, have access  
23 to the Rockefeller material and have read it, and we will try  
24 again not to cover the same ground except insofar as I would like  
25 to hit upon certain specifics that I don't believe we've gone

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1 into.

2 I also have some documents here I would like to show you  
3 in varying degrees that will have to be read, and I think we can  
4 take them one at a time, and you will be given an adequate chance  
5 to read them, and should we reach a determination it is necessary  
6 to do so, the minute there are any questions on them, we can  
7 do that for each document.

8 Mr. Angleton, do you recall when you became aware that there  
9 was a mail intercept project in New York City?

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1 TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON -- Resumed

2 Mr. Angleton. I don't know the date, but I assume that I  
3 learned of it through Herman Horton, who was my Deputy in 1954.

4 Mr. Wallach. At that time it was being run by the Office  
5 of Security, is that correct?

6 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

7 Mr. Wallach. Did there come a point in time when the  
8 operation was taken over, at least the substantive parts of the  
9 operations as compared to the procedural and mechanical aspects  
10 of gathering together and intercepting the mail, that this was  
11 taken over by the CIA staff?

12 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

13 Mr. Wallach. When was that, sir?

14 Mr. Angleton. Well, there is a chrono on this entire  
15 thing. I think the best chrono is this report, if I can find  
16 it in the Rockefeller Commission. '55, I believe, at the time.

17 Mr. Wallach. Is the document you are looking at now the  
18 attachment, prepared for the Rockefeller Commission and submitted  
19 the day you testified there?

20 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

21 The time was 1955.

22 Mr. Wallach. Given that approximate time, Mr. Angleton,  
23 do you recall how the decision was reached that CIA staff would  
24 take over the project?

25 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there was a question, I think

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1 there were a number of matters involved here. I think one of  
2 them was that security was undergoing some kind of freeze.  
3 Second, I believe the Division wanted out. I think there were  
4 a combination of factors which led to the feeling on the part  
5 of many that the program would be discontinued for lack of  
6 funding and personnel. The other point is that Mr. Horton  
7 had very close relationships with the Office of Security and  
8 I assume they went to him on it because even though there is a  
9 memorandum by DiSilva to the effect that the project was not  
10 to be used for counterintelligence purposes, that is very  
11 unrealistic, because Mr. Timm, who put up the project, was  
12 himself a counterintelligence officer. He had been formerly  
13 FBI, and then he was OSS counterintelligence during the war,  
14 in fact his whole career was in a professional sense in counter-  
15 intelligence. And I don't feel that the thrust of it was  
16 entirely positive intelligence in his mind.

17 I knew him extremely well.

18 Further, there was, which I have not seen reflected in  
19 the papers I have read, the security was very much involved  
20 operationally in terms of penetration of the Agency in  
21 security cases, and this goes back to the post-OSS period,  
22 at least after the war when I was abroad, and there were a lot  
23 of hearings on penetration of OSS, and this was supported by  
24 some very highly sensitive documentation, Soviet in nature, to  
25 the extent of penetration and security were charged with this

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1 problem of trying to clean out the combination of Communist  
2 Party members, probably Soviet intelligence, and also known  
3 homosexuals which also were in the counter-intelligence side.

4 So, I think that what the record does not reflect is that  
5 there were very strong counter-intelligence stressed by the  
6 very people who, in a sense, played a part in the originating  
7 of the entire program.

8 And I find that conflict with, as I say, DiSilva or Doran,  
9 *Dana Durand?*  
10 Dan Doran, or he stated or made some comment that it should  
11 not be a -- it was not for counter-intelligence purposes, that  
12 it was entirely misleading.

13 And in the penetration part of it, of the problems con-  
14 fronting security, Mr. Horton had much to do with that as well  
15 as Mr. O'Neal. In other words, there was a very firm  
16 relationship going back into all of the other kinds of cases.

17 Mr. Wallach. I'm not entirely sure I understand, when  
18 you talk about the Office of Security at that time probably  
19 continually being occupied with penetration, how that would  
20 affect their handling the project. Are you talking strictly  
21 about manpower, because it is my understanding that project  
22 still took up a heck of a lot of time for the Office of  
23 Security in terms of manpower.

24 Are you talking about manpower down at Headquarters?

25 Mr. Angleton. No. I only saw and noticed the effect that  
in one of Herman's memos which he drafted, he talked about the

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1 freeze in Security, the fact that Security were hamstrung for  
2 personnel, etc, and starting out in '55, the staff having been  
3 pulled together in '54, we did have a lot of slots and we had  
4 a lot of latitude, that it would be very natural in terms of  
5 the associations for someone to put up to the staff for taking  
6 away the project.

7 Mr. Wallach. This might be kind of a hypothetical that I'm  
8 going to pose, but if you really don't feel that you can give an  
9 answer on it, just let me know.

10 For example, if Security had continued with the project,  
11 would they have had the expertise to really do anything with it  
12 besides really straight, positive intelligence? I think you may  
13 have suggested that, that there was sort of a natural gravitation  
14 to CI staff once it developed.

15 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I think there was a natural gravitation.  
16 I think the Security's interest, they would have been able to  
17 handle, but it would have been a very small slice of the project.  
18 In other words, theirs would have only been personnel, and then,  
19 in correspondence within Agency people, and Soviet units and  
20 so on.

21 Mr. Wallach. I would like at this time, Mr. Angleton, to  
22 show you a document that I will just ask the Reporter to subse-  
23 quently mark as Angleton Exhibit 1 for identification of  
24 this date. It is --, I am not actually sure whether it is  
25 one memorandum -- I'm sorry, there is an attachment that shouldn't

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1 be -- it is one memorandum in a couple of different sections,  
2 some 16 pages, dated November 7, 1955, on HTLINGUAL. I think  
3 that is a sufficient identification, and I'll ask you just to  
4 take a quick look at that.

5 (The document referred to was  
6 marked Angleton Exhibit No. 1  
7 for identification.)

8 (Angleton Exhibit No. 1 will  
9 be found in the files of the  
10 Committee.)  
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1 Mr. Angleton. I have seen this. It is a fairly involved  
2 memo.

3 Mr. Wallach. The reason I said not to look at it thoroughly  
4 is there are a lot of facts and figures that we'll be going into,  
5 but do take a look at it.

6 Mr. Angleton. Well, if you want to call my attention to  
7 any specifics in it.

8 Mr. Wallach. Well, just take a quick look through and I'll  
9 call your attention to a couple of specifics.

10 My first question was going to be whether or not you  
11 recall this before. In fact, there is some handwriting on I  
12 guess the third page and fourth page, and I wonder if that is  
13 yours.

14 Mr. Angleton. No. No, I don't recognize it. It might have  
15 been <sup>Bird</sup> Bert O'Neal's. I'm not sure.

16 Mr. Wallach. But in any event, you believe you at least  
17 saw this document at some point in time.

18 Mr. Angleton. I have seen it, certainly after, you know,  
19 recently, but this is apparently a draft, is it not? It is a  
20 draft document?

21 Mr. Wallach. Does it say that on it? Why do you say  
22 apparently?

23 Mr. Angleton. Well, it wouldn't be a document with all  
24 of these corrections on it.

25 Mr. Wallach. We are unable to determine if we got it from

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1 an individual's file or not, or if someone just may have made  
2 comments on it or crossed things out after they received it.

3 Mr. Angleton. No, no. This thing looks as though it had  
4 gone from one party to another.

5 Mr. Wallach. I agree. For example, on page 6 there are  
6 portions crossed out and additions made.

7 Mr. Angleton. It looks very much like a paper that was  
8 run through a staffing process.

9 Mr. Wallach. In any event, we haven't found a final  
10 version, if there is one. So this is all we have to work from  
11 at this time.

12 I don't think I'll have any questions on the portions that  
13 are crossed out or handwritten in.

14 Mr. Angleton. The language is very much like O'Neal's.  
15 Every "i" is dotted and every "t" is crossed.

16 Mr. Wallach. When the project was taken over by CI staff,  
17 was it then a mail opening project or was it just a mail inter-  
18 cept, mail cover project?

19 Mr. Angleton. Well, I really don't know. It could have been  
20 both. It could have been in the process of changing, but I had  
21 a feeling that openings had been taking place before.

22 But the paragraph 5 which I am looking at now --

23 (Pause)

24 Although on page 3 there is the line to the effect that  
25 under the conditions existing now, our personnel are getting

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1 access, etc., for exterior examination. It is possible,  
2 discretely to gain exclusive access to the contents of a limited  
3 number of selected communications, and I think that seems to  
4 be at variance with some other paper I have also seen.

5 I thought an earlier part, that openings were taking place.

6 Mr. Wallach. Are the documents you're looking at now  
7 copies of documents that went into the Rockefeller Commission?

8 Mr. Angleton. No. I got it from a fellow. I haven't  
9 examined it.

10 Mr. Wallach. From whom?

11 Mr. Angleton. From the project -- no, not the project  
12 but one of the men who's still back on the staff.

13 Mr. Wallach: Mr. Tsikerdanos?

14 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

15 (Pause)

16 Mr. Wallach. While Mr. Angleton is looking through the  
17 documents I would like to explain, going a bit into the  
18 Rockefeller Commission, that there is some question as to  
19 whether or not there was ever explicit authorization in terms  
20 of switching from a mail intercept, mail cover to a mail  
21 opening project.

22 Mr. Angleton. I understand the question.

23 Mr. Wallach. But I think a couple of later documents  
24 suggest that -- well, I will let Mr. Angleton finish looking  
25 through the documents that he has.

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1 Mr. Angleton. Well, I just want to see if I can see this  
2 to find anything --

3 (Pause)

4 Mr. Wallach. In one of the documents there is reference  
5 to the fact that openings have been going on for some time. I  
6 think that is a year after this document, I think it is a '56  
7 document that that is in.

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, this is so repetitious that --

9 (Pause)

10 In '53, December, they are discussing this, saying we  
11 now wish to carry out the second step of this arrangement, and  
12 that is to photograph the fronts and backs of first class mail.

13 Mr. Wallach. I think the first step there just might have  
14 been a survey to see how much mail came in and out.

15 Are those documents entirely related to the New York  
16 project, Mr. Angleton?

17 Mr. Angleton. Either that or collateral.

18 Mr. Wallach. Do you have any objection to letting us take  
19 a look at them?

20 Mr. Angleton. Well, I would rather leave that to the  
21 Agency. I was supposed to see the General Counsel and I have not  
22 been able to get a hold of him.

23 Mr. Wallach. I don't understand what seeing the General  
24 Counsel --

25 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, I was supposed to get the

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1 guidelines for appearing here.

2 Mr. Wallach. You mean even before your appearance last  
3 week?

4 Mr. Angleton. Yes. And they were all tied up.

5 Mr. Wallach. I just think for the purposes of examination  
6 I would like to go on your memory. You have been over the  
7 subject before.

8 Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't recall the first time they  
9 were actually opened, whether it was with us. I was under the  
10 impression that there had been something going on in the opening,  
11 but there wasn't very much because there wasn't much personnel  
12 and they didn't have the people to process. In other words,  
13 that is my impression, that there had been opening. In November  
14 of '55 there is a statement that the only added function that  
15 would be formed by Security in the new project is that more  
16 letters will be opened, the implication being that letters were  
17 being opened.

18 They are presently able to open only a very limited number.  
19 Under the new setup, with full time employees, Security will  
20 be able to obtain the addressor, addressees and total correspon-  
21 dence against approximately 75 percent at the present time.

22 So, I mean, if that sentence is correct, then it means  
23 that the letters were being opened, and that the only thing,  
24 one of the changes would be that more letters would be  
25 opened.

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1 Mr. Wallach. I think you'll find the documents do not  
2 pin down a specific date for the authorization of the actual  
3 beginning of the project. I think it may, in fact, have  
4 happened -- the interceptors may have begun to do it themselves  
5 and then the Agency responding, it says, well, it looks like  
6 we can do it. But I was wondering what your actual recollection  
7 was. I realize it's twenty-odd years ago.

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, it isn't quite that. I mean, I take  
9 full responsibility for everything, but I really didn't spend  
10 that much time in this business, and what I am really trying  
11 to say is Mr. Horton, who was my Deputy, was the one who  
12 detailed, go through all of this negotiating, and so on.

13 Mr. Wallach. I'd just like to make it clear that I'm  
14 not really here to assess responsibility or anything like that.  
15 All I'm trying to do is get your memory as to --

16 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean my point being that almost  
17 everything I know about the origins of the mail have been from  
18 December of last year on in terms of going back through all  
19 these little papers.

20 Mr. Wallach. In other words, aside from your review of  
21 the documents of December on, you really have no independent  
22 recollection of that time period?

23 Mr. Angleton. No. My impression is that the documents  
24 were being opened, but on a very small scale, due to personnel  
25 and due to the procedural set up. They didn't have the

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1 interpreters, they didn't have the substantive people who could  
2 spot. In other words, it was a very poor program in terms of  
3 exploitation.

4 Mr. Wallach. You mean they didn't have the interpreters  
5 or the substantive people?

6 Mr. Angleton. Well, they didn't have them in the sense  
7 that we later had people devoted entirely to this project.

8 Mr. Wallach. Well, without getting into that, you're  
9 talking about people back at Headquarters or people at the  
10 intercept point?

11 Mr. Angleton. No, at the Headquarters. I mean there were  
12 not files built up, as I recall.

13 Mr. Wallach. Now I think in your other dates you are  
14 correct.

15 Mr. Angleton. And it took a lot of trial and error to  
16 finally get through from handwritten files to punchcard to  
17 machine tapes.

18 Mr. Wallach. I think the figures which I'm sure you've  
19 seen which were compiled in January of this year show some  
20 12,000 documents or letters being opened in 1954 which surprised  
21 me when I saw these figures, because I hadn't thought it was  
22 anywhere near that. I thought the 832 from 1956 was correct,  
23 and I think that 12,000 may be in the wrong column.

24 But in any event, do you see the 12,000 I'm referring  
25 to?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I do.

2 Unless that was supposed to take up all the mail that had  
3 ever been opened prior to that, I don't know. Because it's  
4 not responsive to the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 up above.

5 Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't think there's any explanation  
6 as to what that figure means.

7 Mr. Angleton. I can find out, because I talked to Mrs.  
8 Metzen last night, and she has her fingertips on practically  
9 everything on the project.

10 Mr. Wallach. That is Elana Metzen?

11 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

12 Mr. Wallach. Well, why don't we go back through this  
13 document at hand, and for the time being, forego this question?

14 Mr. Angleton. All right.

15 (Pause)

16 I think I can finally answer to that, I would think,  
17 without any trouble from her. Has she been asked the question?

18 Mr. Wallach. No, I don't believe she has.

19 Mr. Angleton. And the other person who would know would  
20 be Scotty Miler.

21 Mr. Wallach. What was Scotty Miler's position at this  
22 time, as of 1955, do you recall?

23 Mr. Angleton. If I recall correctly, he was working with  
24 Bertram O'Neal on Special Investigations, which was a unit  
25 closely tied in with the Office of Security.

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1       The primary task was the penetration of the Agency and  
2 the government and historical penetration cases are recruitment  
3 of U.S. officials in positions, code clerks. It had a very  
4 tight filing system of its own, and it was the only component  
5 in the counterintelligence that had access to the security  
6 files and the personnel maintained by the Office of Security.  
7 And he was either the Deputy or one of the principal officers  
8 with O'Neal.

9       Mr. Wallach. I realize that in your testimony before the  
10 Rockefeller Commission and in your paper that you prepared for  
11 the meeting, it was extensively discussed, I guess the conditions  
12 that existed at the time, the Cold War conditions, suspected  
13 penetration of the Agency, and other things, and I think that  
14 will come out clear. I think it's quite important in focusing  
15 on the beginnings of the operation, as you explained, and I  
16 don't want to lose sight of that in turning to this memorandum,  
17 but for example -- and again, I'm only asking if there were  
18 discussions that you remember -- this memorandum, for example,  
19 on the first page in Section 3, under "Situations," says:  
20 "There's no overt authorized legal censorship or monitoring of  
21 first-class mails which enter, depart or transit the United  
22 States at the present time."

23       Mr. Angleton. Which memorandum? Is this one I looked  
24 at?

25       Mr. Wallach. This is one you looked at.

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1 Mr. Angleton. All right.

2 Mr. Wallach. And all I'm trying to get from you is if  
3 you recall any discussions at that time as to whether -- about  
4 the subject and about the fact that there is no legal monitoring.  
5 By that, I take it they mean opening or showing, whatever they  
6 mean by monitoring the mails.

7 Do you recall discussions about the legality, or even  
8 entering into this?

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, I read a lot about this since, but  
10 I don't think I ever participated in any of the meetings dealing  
11 with that problem.

12 Mr. Wallach. You say you read about discussions?

13 Mr. Angleton. I read about it since. I mean, I read all  
14 of these papers which go into the whole legal business.

15 Mr. Wallach. But I, from reading the documents that we  
16 have, and the Agency, has told me for all intents and purposes  
17 that is what they have. I do not see any papers which reflect  
18 discussions in the '50's on the legality or illegality.

19 Mr. Angleton. Well, doesn't that --

20 Mr. Wallach. This one does, but it doesn't set forth any  
21 discussion. It is just a fact that seems to be stated. It does  
22 not permit it at this time.

23 I was wondering if you recall any discussions about that  
24 at all.

25 Mr. Angleton. Well I mean there were discussions leading

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1 up to Helms and the Director going to the Postmaster General  
2 and all of that.

3 Mr. Wallach. That was in 1971.

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, they went much earlier than that.  
5 I mean, back in the '50's.

6 Mr. Wallach. Well, Mr. Dulles did go to Mr. Helms, I  
7 think back in '54 to meet with the then-Postmaster General,  
8 but I don't think the record shows that the Postmaster General  
9 was briefed on the fact that there was going to be any mail  
10 openings.

11 Mr. Angleton. I mean, to me, I think there was a lot of  
12 dispute on whether he was briefed about it.

13 Mr. Wallach. You think there was dispute about whether  
14 Mr. Summerfield was briefed in the 1950's, or Mr. Day in '61.

15 Mr. Angleton. Both.

16 Mr. Wallach. In any event -- was Mr. Dulles aware, to the  
17 best of your knowledge, that mail was being opened in New  
18 York?

19 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think I ever saw  
20 any detailed piece of paper on any of these visits. Well, they  
21 were all kind of short.

22 Mr. Wallach. I think I'll have a memorandum later that  
23 may cast some doubt as to whether Mr. Dulles was aware the  
24 mail was being opened.

25 Do you remember discussing it with him?

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1 Mr. Angleton. I don't remember discussing it with any  
2 Director outside of Helms.

3 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you would not know then if  
4 Mr. McCone was aware, for example?

5 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I mean -- let me put it this  
6 way. I don't think anyone tried to withhold anything from  
7 Mr. McCone. Just being sort of an impression that he himself  
8 was disturbed that people didn't tell him, and I think it is  
9 not realistic in terms of the way he ran the business.

10 Mr. McCone was an individual who had a lot of experience in  
11 government and he had a personal style of his own. He lived  
12 by the record. His interest in the business was almost  
13 exclusively devoted to items which were subject matters for  
14 the Cabinet. In other words, it didn't matter how mundane a  
15 program would be, as long as it was Cabinet-level, he went into  
16 it in the most exhaustive fashion. He did not deal with the  
17 case officers down the line.

18 In one case which I was handling with him, he read not  
19 only my analysis and so on. He read all of the attachments  
20 down into the interrogations, and whatnot. In other words,  
21 the actual data.

22 Once he had discharged that as a Cabinet matter, it then  
23 reverted back way down into the bowels of the organization,  
24 and six months later there might be a glimmer of this come  
25 back again and he would update himself in the intervening

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1 period. And that is the way he ran the Agency. He was not  
2 interested in a lot of gratuitous matters dealing, say, with  
3 mail intercepts or so on. If there had been mail intercept  
4 which involved the penetration high in the government, I can  
5 assure you it would have gone to him.

6 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. Helms run the Agency in a different  
7 fashion?

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, I am just talking about Mr.  
9 McCone. He was a very unusual man in the sense of how he ran  
10 the Agency. He depended very directly on basically two men,  
11 one was Ray Cline and the other was Dick Helms, plus his Exec  
12 Officer, and you know, some of the people around his immediate  
13 office. But I am just saying to put it in proper perspective,  
14 there was no one withholding from Mr. McCone anything, and  
15 I think there were many of them who would give a great deal to  
16 go up and talk about mundane problems.

17 Mr. Wallach. Well, just going back again to Mr. Dulles,  
18 the record does reflect that in '54 he did go over with Mr.  
19 Helms and meet with Mr. Summerfield, and I think the record  
20 also shows that at that time in '54, at least, it was a mail  
21 intercept project in the sense that the mail was just being  
22 photograph or transliterated, the covers of the mail. It was  
23 not being opened.

24 The only point I was really trying to get at was Mr.  
25 Dulles was -- it's not really clear whether or not and I'm not

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1 saying anybody was hiding anything from him, that he ever found  
2 out that the operation changed.

3 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't know.

4 Let's put it this way. I don't think the project ever had  
5 any caveat of not informing the Director of any piece of  
6 intercept which had broad implications and should be brought to  
7 his attention. I mean that's almost automatic, and it goes  
8 for all kinds of collection.

9 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall instances of bringing the  
10 product to the attention of various Directors?

11 Mr. Angleton. Well, basically, Mr. Helms, because of a lot  
12 of things dealing with civil unrest in that period, about a  
13 fugitive from justice, the making of bombs, things of this  
14 sort.

15 Mr. Wallach. Was this when he was DDP?

16 Mr. Angleton. No, he was Director.

17 Mr. Wallach. Director.

18 There's one other part I'd like to talk to you about and  
19 really get your opinion on in a second. In the next page of  
20 this memorandum, it states that "It must be assumed that foreign  
21 espionage agents have relied on this policy of the United  
22 States government" -- by that, it is referring to the policy  
23 of, there's no legal opening or monitoring of mails -- "and  
24 this has resulted in extensive use of the mail for intelligence  
25 purposes to our detriment."

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1           What I would like to get at is if it is your believe that  
2 this is really true, or was true then, and did it subsequently  
3 change, or do you think it is still true that there is that  
4 reliance on the protection, you know, the privacy of the  
5 mails?

6           Mr. Angleton. I think there was up to the time that it  
7 became exposed.

8           Mr. Wallach. What you're saying then is you do not  
9 believe the Soviets knew we were conducting this program?

10          Mr. Angleton. Personally I don't think they did, but I  
11 mean, that is purely a personal view on it. Of course, they  
12 would have known if there had been any penetration, but I mean,  
13 aside from that, I don't think they necessarily knew of it,  
14 because after all, you had a number of exchange students using  
15 the mails and in their system, no one travelling outside can  
16 get either a passport or a valida as foreign exchange who  
17 isn't processed by the intelligence organs as to his possible  
18 usage, and particularly those scientific schools, and so on.  
19 And also a lot of it is preparation for them for future jobs  
20 on the American or the British desk.

21          In fact, I would assume that they probably spent several  
22 hundred thousand manhours going back through all the cases  
23 and files and doing analysis to see what came through the  
24 mails.

25          Mr. Wallach. Was it your understanding, then, at least at

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1 this time that the project would only pick up mail where either  
2 the addressee or the sender was a Soviet?

3 Mr. Angleton. No, I think it was all communications that  
4 came out of the Soviet Union and went into it. A lot of the  
5 mail was actually sent by third nationals here.

6 In other words, you will find somebody's brother, maybe from  
7 Africa or someplace, and his brother is at the Lumumba University  
8 or a cousin or a relative and you've got a lot of Latin American  
9 mail, people who are relatives, friends or associates in some  
10 group that they're studying here in the United States commu-  
11 cating to their friend in Moscow. So the linkage is important.

12 Mr. Wallach. Turning again to what you said and was  
13 thoroughly described in your attachment to the Rockefeller  
14 Report is the tenor of the times that existed then. I think  
15 in reading that and then looking at paragraph 6 of this  
16 memorandum which deals with security and subparagraph (c) which  
17 is on page 7, which reads: "In the event of compromise of the  
18 aspect of the project involving internal monitoring of mails,  
19 serious public reaction in the United States would probably  
20 occur. Conceivably, pressures would be placed on Congress to  
21 inquire into such allegations, but it is believed that any  
22 problems arising could be satisfactorily handled."

23 What I'm trying to get at is, given that tenor of the times,  
24 it would surprise me that you would still believe there would  
25 be serious public reaction to finding out about this program.

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1 Mr. Dick. For what period of time was Mr. Horton your  
2 Deputy?

3 Mr. Angleton. I have it somewhere here.

4 He started with me when I took over the Counterintelligence  
5 Staff. He had been in the FBI and then he had been with the  
6 Agency -- I mean, the OSS.

7 He had also been a lawyer. When he started, he was well  
8 up on Federal statutes.

9 I cannot put my hands on it right now, but I have all the  
10 dates.

11 Mr. Wallach. Well, I think maybe then we can just check  
12 it with the Agency if you don't have it right here.

13 Mr. Angleton. No.

14 Mr. Wallach. One other general aspect I'd like to talk  
15 to you on which is reflected in the memorandum, and there is  
16 no reason now to go over it, is the oft-repeated statement here  
17 that the security factors require no disclosure whatever be  
18 made to any persons or organizations outside the CIA. And I  
19 was wondering, at that time -- and I realize there were certain  
20 problems that existed later on between the CIA and the FBI,  
21 and we will go into them in the '58 events by which the CIA  
22 or the FBI became informed of the project, but I was wondering  
23 why, for example, this would not have been thought of as a  
24 project that would have been very useful to the FBI at that  
25 time, and the FBI also at least brought into the project, or

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1 some sort of joint project. Was that just something that  
2 didn't happen and then you just realized later on that it  
3 didn't happen?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that the relations with the  
5 FBI were very spotty, leading up to '54. When DeLoach was the  
6 Liaison Officer there were a number of problems and there was  
7 also a very strong feeling by Mr. Hoover about CIA men who had  
8 been former FBI people. There wasn't something generated out of  
9 the CI Staff. It was one that probably went back since Eric Timm  
10 was FBI, Bill Harvey was FBI. We stole a number of FBI people  
11 and it wasn't the best of relations.

12 Mr. Wallach. Have you been, or are you aware today, of  
13 the various projects, mail intercepts and mail opening projects  
14 that were conducted by the Bureau since World War II in the  
15 United States?

16 Mr. Angleton. No. I am aware of the fact that there  
17 were, from time to time. I mean there, operationally, were  
18 matters that would come up, whether we would get a certain mail  
19 coverage.

20 Mr. Wallach. Are you aware, for example, of continual  
21 projects from 1946 through 1966 of various foreign establishments  
22 in the U.S. run by the Bureau, and this is not something that  
23 popped up from time to time? Going to the specifics of it,  
24 it was existing in '55, but there are no Bureau records that would  
25 reflect that anybody at the CIA was made aware of it until

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1 approximately '61.

2 Mr. Angleton. No, I think anything we've done regarding  
3 FBI coverage came out of the counterintelligence reports of  
4 the case that was broken and the surveillance and whatnot,  
5 and after all, you'd learn how to read those reports and know  
6 more or less where the sources are from.

7 Mr. Wallach. I think we've gotten the same type of testimony  
8 from other people.

9 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

10 Mr. Wallach. In other words, after reading it, and from  
11 your experience, you can tell this was gotten from mail  
12 intercept?

13 Mr. Angleton. That's right, and they had more sophisticated  
14 means. Ours was shotgun treatment, theirs was mainly rifle  
15 treatment.

16 Mr. Wallach. What do you mean by that?

17 Mr. Angleton. We were covering a vast amount of mail;  
18 the Bureau's interest was more or less pinpointed on matters  
19 that came as a result of a breakthrough or identification of  
20 some active case. That is at least my understanding of how  
21 they operate.

22 Mr. Wallach. Did the Bureau, at any time, stop sending  
23 the CIA intelligence reports on cases and things, the ones  
24 you described?

25 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think probably the most painful case --

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1 may I go off the record on this?

2 Mr. Wallach. We'll go off the record.

3 (Discussion off the record.)

4 Mr. Wallach. I think we can go back on the record. I  
5 think the record can reflect that when we went off the record,  
6 Mr. Angleton went into one or two specific cases and just a  
7 further explanation of his reasons why there was not the best  
8 of cooperative worlds between the Agency and the Bureau in the  
9 early '50s.

10 I would like now to show you a document which I would  
11 like marked as Angleton Exhibit 2 for our identification, and  
12 it's a two page document, it's a memorandum for Acting  
13 Deputy Director of Plans. It's from Mr. Angleton, and there's  
14 a date on it that's not entirely legible, but it is a '56  
15 document.

16 Mr. Angleton. Does it show the drafter of the document?

17 Mr. Wallach. Well, let me show it to you, Mr. Angleton.

18 (Pause)

19 Mr. Angleton. No, it's not signed by me; it's signed by  
20 my Deputy for me, if you look at that.

21 Mr. Wallach. Right. You are correct in that.

22 I'm not going to have any specific questions on it  
23 but what I'd like to do is focus your attention on the second  
24 paragraph for a minute which goes to the question about  
25 Mr. Dulles' knowledge of the mail opening aspect of it. Once

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1 again I'm not saying anything was held back from him. There  
2 it says the Director approved the undertaking in principle in  
3 its initial stages in May 1954, and took steps which have,  
4 through a developmental stage, resulted in a formulation of  
5 the program and its approval by you.

6 Now, looking at that language, back in 1954, the CI staff  
7 was not involved, and the records seem to reflect that, at least  
8 in '54, that there may have just been isolated instances of  
9 mail opening, but it was really a mail screening, mail cover  
10 project. From this it looked like Mr. Helms himself approved  
11 the HTLINGUAL aspects of it, and the CI staff, when they came,  
12 there was probably mail opening before, but it was more formalized.

13 Now, I guess it would be more appropriate to ask Mr.  
14 Helms, really, did you tell Mr. Dulles about it, but I'm just  
15 showing you this second paragraph to -- maybe that would refresh  
16 you.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 2  
for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 2 will be  
found in the files of the  
Committee.)

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Mr. Angleton. It does not illuminate for me at all.

Mr. Wallach. Okay.

What I'm really, as you're aware, trying to get at is the procedural part of it, not at the question of responsibility or anything like that, as to a project that Mr. Dulles, you know, may have first briefed Mr. Summerfield on as a mail opening project sort of turned into that. He may or may not have been informed, possibly because he never asked, not because anybody withheld anything.

Mr. Angleton. Well, he would have been told the details because he wouldn't have gone there unless he had interrogated who brought up the proposal.

Mr. Wallach. But my statement is he went up there in early '54 and at that time we don't really have a mail opening project as such.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, that's what I have not been able to find here, whether this is -- let me just see if this throws any light on it.

(Pause)

Now, going back here, and this is just an aside, but this reflects that Dana Doran, who was head of the Soviet Division, had queried the FBI back in '52, '53, as to whether they had any records of correspondence between Soviet and U. S. citizens, and the Bureau did reply that they did not maintain such records except that uncovered in the general security or espionage

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1 cases.

2 Mr. Wallach. What you're looking at is the master list  
3 of documents that was in the summaries, that was put together  
4 by the Agency?

5 Mr. Angleton. Yes, it's one of the summaries.

6 Mr. Wallach. Well, I really don't think that we should  
7 dwell on that point.

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, I am trying to boil this down to a  
9 little more perspective, to see whether there is any indication  
10 when the mail was opened.

11 Mr. Wallach. I think we can get a clearer indication of that  
12 by going back to the vault, I think we may have done this; I don't  
13 think we have the papers here, and looking at the first papers in the vault.

14 Mr. Angleton. On what dates were there?

15 Mr. Wallach. Truthfully I don't remember, but I think we  
16 can trace it back that way.

17 (Pause.)

18 Mr. Angleton. No, it doesn't say anything unless it does  
19 down here.

20 (Pause)

21 Mr. Angleton. No, it skips over the question of when the  
22 first openings occurred.

23 Mr. Wallach. All right. I think we might be able to  
24 go back the Agency, and we'll get documentation as to that  
25 specific point.

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1 Can you tell me in the early days, I'm talking '55, '56,  
2 '57, the fifties, how really the project was set up at Head-  
3 quarters in terms, was there any project staff as existed in the  
4 later years?

5 Mr. Angleton. Yes, there was a group of about six people.  
6 I don't think it went above six. They handled Russian, Yiddish,  
7 Spanish, German, French, and these different skills were divided  
8 up among the six people who were known as the CI Project, and  
9 their purpose was simply to analyze the correspondence that  
10 was opened, write a digest, and then there would be cleared  
11 people within certain branches, geographic branches in the  
12 division who were recipients, and their job was to fuse or  
13 meld it with their own activities and to hopefully refine the  
14 watch list. In other words, they would levy requirements or  
15 indicate that such and such was of no interest.

16 Mr. Wallach. You said levy requirements. They would ask  
17 for a particular person to be placed on the watch list, and  
18 if any mail came either to or from that person --

19 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

20 Mr. Wallach. It would be intercepted.

21 Mr. Angleton. And then when they finish with the Xerox,  
22 a copy of the digest would be sent back to this group where it  
23 was destroyed, periodical destruction.

24 Mr. Wallach. Of the copies.

25 Mr. Angleton. Of the copies.

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1 But they maintained a copy which was first carded  
2 manually, and then it went to punch card, and then eventually  
3 it went to a tape, the control of which we maintain a computer  
4 tape.

5 Mr. Wallach. What instructions were actually given to the  
6 Office of Security intercept officers who actually picked up  
7 the mail and opened it and then sent it down to Headquarters?

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, they were given, they were told what  
9 was of interest and what was not, and I think they had a watch  
10 list, and there was one individual who was fairly sophisticated  
11 and had a great deal of experience in this field and he,  
12 together with the watch list, could make a fairly accurate  
13 coverage of the mail.

14 Mr. Wallach. Is that  you're referring to?

15 Mr. Angleton. Yes, that's right.

16 Mr. Wallach. What I'm really trying to get at is aside  
17 from the watch list, which you viewed as   
18 capabilities, he did not have any training in counterintelligence  
19 ability, did he?

20 Mr. Angleton. Well, I never have seen his PHS.

21 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever met

22 Mr. Angleton. No.

23 Mr. Wallach. Well, then, what I'm really trying to find  
24 out is aside from the watch list, this is something I am asking  
25 most of the people that I've talked to who have been working

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1 on the project, there does not seem to have been any real  
2 guidance that went out to the people in the field, the Office of  
3 Security people whenever they were trained in counterintelligence  
4 or the actual people who were picking up the mail.

5 Mr. Angleton. I think there was definitely guidance  
6 explained to them on what was of interest and what was not of  
7 interest.

8 Mr. Wallach. You mean separate from the watch list?

9 Mr. Angleton. No, I mean the watch list, the embodiment  
10 of it.

11 Mr. Wallach. But I think that at least the figures that  
12 have been provided to us show that there were varying figures  
13 for varying years, some years as high as 65 percent of the  
14 mail was picked up, was randomly picked up, that was not on the  
15 watch list.

16 Mr. Angleton. I agree there because there were a lot of  
17 P.O. boxes which were catchalls in Moscow, so you'd follow a  
18 P.O. box number, a general delivery, and you began to find that  
19 certain organizations in the United States were writing to that  
20 P.O. box. Some of the correspondence of Philby, as I recall,  
21 to people in this country, the return was a Post Office box  
22 number. So we put, right across the board, all mail  
23 addressed to that Post Office box was picked up.

24 Mr. Wallach. That Post Office box itself was on the watch  
25 list.

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1 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

2 Mr. Wallach. I'm talking about items now that were not  
3 on the watch list.

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, there was a lot of random  
5 collection.

6 Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is how did Mr.  
7 Issaef and various other people who helped him at one time or  
8 another --

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, he had a good idea what was wanted.  
10 He was not completely isolated from what the purpose of the  
11 entire project was. In other words, he had many helpful views  
12 and ideas on, I mean, what was important.

13 Mr. Wallach. How do you know that, Mr. Angleton?

14 Mr. Angleton. Well, I know it because I was told it.

15 Mr. Wallach. By whom?

16 Mr. Angleton. By people on the project.

17 Mr. Wallach. Would it surprise you then if   
18 told us that he did not have any guidance and often really didn't  
19 know exactly what it was that was wanted?

20 Mr. Angleton. It would surprise me very much.

21 Mr. Wallach. It would?

22 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean, it surprised me a great  
23 deal because the people in the project, I've heard them say  
24 that it couldn't have been done without him.

25 Mr. Wallach. Is that because of his facility in Russian?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Well, and his general perceptions. I mean,  
2 how he could himself interpret the envelopes and the addressees  
3 and so on.

4 Mr. Wallach. Well, a good percentage of the mail that  
5 went back two and from the Soviet Union was, at least from the  
6 Soviet Union, was propaganda.

7 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

8 Mr. Wallach. And I believe that --

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, there was a big interest in government  
10 at one time on suppressing propaganda mail. I don't know what  
11 happened, but it goes way back. My recollection is, I don't  
12 even know whether the mail was in fact suppressed, I mean, the  
13 propaganda mail.

14 Mr. Wallach. Did you yourself at any time have occasion  
15 to make a cursory review of the types of mail that was coming  
16 in?

17 Mr. Angleton. No. Items would be sent to me but they were  
18 items relating to cases we were on.

19 Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is the basis,  
20 and you said that people had told you this, saying that it  
21 couldn't have been done without  It seems that if  
22 1 million pieces came through, discounting propaganda, if the  
23 time is -- there's only a certain amount of mail that Mr.  
24 Issaef can get to, and I don't really know how it can be  
25 determined if he missed some or didn't miss some.

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1 How could anybody back at Headquarters make that judgment  
2 as to whether he was getting all that was good, or just 10  
3 percent of what was good, which looked like a lot, if nobody  
4 really knew. That's what I'm --

5 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't think that is correct.  
6 Scotty Miler and [ ] and another lady who was there  
7 were very much on top of this mail business, and also on the  
8 requirements. In other words, they had a very strong voice in  
9 what was sent to the various branches and divisions, and had  
10 a lot to do with the screening of requests for coverage and  
11 fit it into their activity.

12 Mr. Wallach. Maybe I'm just not making myself clear.  
13 Maybe I just don't understand your answer, but it seems that  
14 we're talking about two different things, one at headquarters,  
15 and I'm not even inquiring into the process at headquarters.  
16 I have no doubt but that there were qualified people there.  
17 I am talking about the communications between headquarters and  
18 the guys in the field who were essentially -- I realize the  
19 only background of them seems to be that they were Office  
20 of Security people who were educated, well educated, and who  
21 went out there and intercepted mail. It doesn't seem to  
22 reflect in here whether there was any real guidance from  
23 headquarters except for the watch list.

24 Mr. Angleton. Well, I'll have to talk to Miler for that.  
25 He can explain that.

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1 Mr. Wallach. What you're saying is you're not really aware  
2 of that aspect, are you.

3 Mr. Angleton. I'm not aware of that aspect of it, but  
4 I don't have any doubts but that there were guidances given  
5 to New York, I mean, they're not out of Personnel. At the  
6 same time I'm confident that the guidance was given.

7 Mr. Wallach. In your view of the documents, have you seen  
8 one document that talks about guidance for the people in New  
9 York besides the watch list?

10 Mr. Angleton. I haven't seen all the documents.

11 Mr. Wallach. You have not seen all the documents, and  
12 those documents that you've seen --

13 Mr. Angleton. I've not seen it.

14 Mr. Wallach. You've not seen it.

15 Mr. Angleton. No.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you know of the particular documents that  
17 you haven't seen?

18 Mr. Angleton. Well, there are two filing cabinets, I  
19 understand, of documents.

20 Mr. Wallach. Relating to this project?

21 Mr. Angleton. I assume relating to the project, yes.

22 Mr. Wallach. Let's just say that from the documents you have  
23 there, it looks like we both have the same amount, so I'm  
24 basing my statement on what I've seen.

25 Mr. Angleton. Well, we've been trying to get ahold of

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1 Mr. Tsikerdanos for three or four days now, but he's gone up  
2 in the House.

3 Mr. Wallach. I'm sorry, in where?

4 Mr. Angleton. In the House, in the House committee.

5 Mr. Wallach. Do you know what he's been doing with the  
6 House Committee?

7 Mr. Angleton. No. He's simply not been available. I  
8 tried to call him last night well past the close of business,  
9 and he was in meetings. He's been working with the Department  
10 of Justice. And the purpose of it was simply to try to get from  
11 him the answers to a lot of questions which I have on my mind,  
12 which are not too far distant from the ones you're asking me  
13 now.

14 Mr. Wallach. You mean by that the one or two areas that  
15 we really covered so far?

16 Mr. Angleton. I've been trying to find out more about the  
17 questions and specifics on events that occurred which are not  
18 reflected in the papers I've seen.

19 Mr. Wallach. I'd like to show you another document which  
20 is an internal FBI memorandum dated January 22, 1958, and it's  
21 from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Bordman, and ask you to take a quick  
22 look at that, sir.

23 (The document referred to  
24 was marked as Angleton Exhibit  
25 No. 3 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Angleton. I see the source there is to protect the

2

3 Mr. Wallach. In any event, we do have an agreement that  
4 the Bureau that any documents that they give us, that we protect  
5 sources and methods, and we do. If it's required we can go  
6 ahead and get them, but we usually don't.

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, I see where they crossed it out, but  
8 they left it on the end.

9 Mr. Wallach. If you're saying there's sloppy editing, yes,  
10 in very many cases.

11 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that this may reflect the  
12 events of the period, but it is my understanding and my  
13 memory that this thing on the Bureau's inquiry was going back and  
14 forth for some time.

15 Mr. Wallach. You mean they had reason to believe that the  
16 CIA was engaging in a mail intercept in New York?

17 Mr. Angleton. Well, my own view is that they were not  
18 entirely ignorant of all this, and this is again the kind of  
19 question which I cannot get a response to. I have a feeling  
20 that we were handling much of this as we would communications  
21 intelligence; that is, disseminating some of the material in  
22 disguised form with false attribution source.

23 Mr. Wallach. Even at that time in '57?

24 Mr. Angleton. Well, that I'd have to find out, but we had  
25 other operations much more sensitive than this, and the material

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1 had to get out into an action element of government in which the  
2 material was camouflaged, rewritten, and given a false source  
3 description. So that would be the normal procedure, even in  
4 the case of this material, assuming that there was something of  
5 great importance that was turned up.

6 Mr. Wallach. Once again what you're stating, it was  
7 kind of assumption or kind of speculation.

8 Mr. Angleton. It's an assumption, but it's one of those  
9 questions which I have been trying to find the answer to.

10 Mr. Wallach. Just looking at this memorandum for a second,  
11 do you remember going over and speaking to Mr. Belmont about this  
12 project on your initiative?

13 Mr. Angleton. No. I talked to Papich.

14 Mr. Wallach. Do you remember going over and talking to  
15 Papich?

16 Mr. Angleton. No. He used to come to our place every  
17 day.

18 Mr. Wallach. Do you remember, did he broach the subject  
19 with you?

20 The reason I'm asking is, it appears the Bureau made  
21 inquiries in New York to the Postal Service for the same type  
22 of project, not the same type of project, but for a project  
23 to mail from the Soviet Union, and that the Postal Service kind  
24 of called CIA Headquarters and said the Bureau is inquiring,  
25 what do you want us to do. And that sort of set the time

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1 frame, you might have gone over there. And then there's a  
2 meeting a couple of days later with the CIA.

3 Mr. Angleton. Well, this is a question where dates are  
4 important, but I do know the files reflect in some part, as I  
5 recall, two different stories, one that the Bureau contacted  
6 the Postal authorities and were told to see CIA, and another  
7 one in which the Postal authorities contacted the CIA to say  
8 the Bureau wants to get into the same field. And anyway, the  
9 decision was made the Bureau had to be cut in.

10 Mr. Wallach. In Mr. Belmont's memorandum -- and I under-  
11 stand he wrote the memorandum and not you -- he quotes you as  
12 saying that the sole purpose of the New York operation was for  
13 the coverage -- the sole purpose of the New York operation's  
14 coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who  
15 might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in  
16 their countries as contacts and sources for CIA.

17 Is that your understanding of the sole purpose of the  
18 operation?

19 Mr. Angleton. No.

20 Mr. Wallach. Well, I think that this may sidetrack us  
21 for a second, but if you would really on the record explain,  
22 it's been, it's kind of documented in various parts here as to  
23 what really you feel are the purposes and benefits of this  
24 operation.

25 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think the basics are simply that

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1 it -- well, starting off first was this security, hopefully  
2 from the Soviets, that this activity was going on, in other  
3 words, that the one would hope that they did not have any  
4 knowledge of it. Otherwise, it could have become a channel  
5 also for deception on their part in a major way.

6 Now, my feeling on that is particularly reviewing Boudien's  
7 letters and Philby's, is that they were unaware of the censorship.

8 Now, I said before and I'll say it again, that the obstacles  
9 for counterintelligence in a democratic society working against  
10 a totalitarian type of intelligence service is very inadequate,  
11 and the obstacles of simply trying to accomplish even the most  
12 minimal investigations or coverage and of course, this varies  
13 to a large extent in the west. I mean, there are many western  
14 services that do have rather complete counterintelligence  
15 coverage, and it is afforded by the entire government.

16 Here, I mean in terms of the perspective of our assets,  
17 the mail program loomed as an extremely important object, I mean  
18 in terms of exsight and insight into Soviets who were traveling  
19 here, Soviet students, and we had an active program of  
20 recruitment, attempted recruitments of Soviet students, our  
21 knowledge that practically every Soviet student is at the  
22 sufferance of KGB, where it is worked in necessarily into the  
23 mechanism. It is also the grounds for preparing young people  
24 in American realities who come back and go into the service  
25 and more active roles.

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1 So that I think that by way of counterintelligence weapons  
2 outside of communications intelligence, and there's practically  
3 little or none of that for the time being, that it was probably  
4 most important overview that Counterintelligence had. It was  
5 also an overview, and we were very active in propaganda in all  
6 different forms, the Cord Meyer operations and so on. And  
7 it had the specific cases, going back into the period of  
8 civil strife and whatnot, it was the only source of information  
9 in those cases.

10 And I think you've seen the requirements which the Bureau  
11 levied, and again, it was the only source of information which  
12 the FBI ever had in those subjects.

13 Mr. Wallach. That is assuming that the Bureau did not have  
14 its own project.

15 Mr. Angleton. I mean, in spite of all of that, this  
16 was documentation, you know, where it differs, I mean, it  
17 goes up to the top of the class in the sense of grading the  
18 bona fides of the sources and information next to Communications  
19 Intelligence; if the opposition does not know it, then the  
20 mail becomes an extremely important source of very high level  
21 information. I mean, it's factual.

22 Mr. Wallach. May I take you one step further on that?

23 Would there be any benefit to an operation like this  
24 if we had, for example, back in '51 Congress had passed a  
25 specific statute and said in certain circumstances the CIA can

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1 open mail, and the Soviets would have known that the CIA could  
2 possibly have done that, and let's say today we passed that  
3 legislation. I think you can understand what I'm getting at.

4 Now, would that have any benefit in just reviewing, I  
5 think probably less benefit, if there was any benefit, but of  
6 having that kind of statute in narrowly prescribed circumstances,  
7 it could be entirely held secret, you know, possibly given  
8 the approval of the President or whatever, if there was different  
9 types of legislation, because I don't believe it now exists --  
10 that it would be of any benefit.

11 I mean, I think this is one of the questions that academia --

12 Mr. Angleton. Well, personally, I am too close to these  
13 inquiries to be very objective on what if because my own personal  
14 view is that, you know, counterintelligence and the work on 7  
15 the Bloc in large measure has been destroyed by these hearings.  
16 That's my personal view.

17 I cannot see a Soviet defector coming over to the United  
18 States, so to speak, in a sense committing suicide. I don't  
19 think that agents who are high level agents are going to have  
20 anything to do with the Agency for a great deal of time with  
21 all of these exposures. I think the Soviets have had very  
22 high level discussions and conferences regarding how they can  
23 exploit this period to achieve the maximum benefits for  
24 themselves.

25 I think they will probably run a damage report on what

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1 they have uncovered through these public hearings in terms of  
2 how it affected their operations. I would also say they probably  
3 put a tremendous number of agents on ice in order to avoid any  
4 type of a reaction.

5 For example, I mean, they've done it in the past when they've  
6 been in a period of crisis, where there's been a crisis in the  
7 West, they have put agents on ice in order to avoid any kind of  
8 political scandal.

9 Mr. Wallach. You're seeing some sort of a backlash in the  
10 U.S.?

11 Mr. Angleton. That type of thing, but after the Gozenko<sup>u</sup>  
12 cases up in Canada for ten years there was a type of prohibition  
13 on operations in Canada because of the impact in Canada politi-  
14 cally that that had in many areas of the world, and these were  
15 conscious decisions that they arrived at.

16 Now, I think any of them saying, what has happened to the  
17 U.S. intelligence community, that the only people they would make  
18 use of would be agents of influence, and find another way of  
19 putting water on the wheel without themselves becoming directly  
20 implicated. I think this would be the normal direction of any  
21 adversary service, when it sees that somebody else is doing  
22 the job for them.

23 So going back to this basic question that you have asked,  
24 I think there may have been in the '50s an opportunity to  
25 have influenced the Congress to have some kind of bills passed

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1 that would have aided the investigative agencies on the problem  
2 of espionage. Other countries do have it.

3 But our General Counsel -- and I am not speaking authori-  
4 tatively here -- it is my impression is that one of our weak-  
5 nesses is that we did not have the General Counsel work into  
6 the planning phases of operations. Usually we went to the  
7 General Counsel when something was going wrong, but not in the  
8 inception of operations. If there had been much more of that,  
9 that type of consultation of things being originated, then a  
10 General Counsel might have been able to cure a number of these  
11 programs by proposing types of legislation.

12 Now, this was not done. Now I think it is too late. I  
13 don't think the mood of the country would support that type of  
14 legislation.

15 Mr. Wallach. Are you saying it's too late because of the  
16 mood of the country or too late for practical reasons?

17 Mr. Angleton. No, I think it is the mood of the country  
18 principally, and then, as I say, I suspend judgment, my own  
19 personal view is that it would not have the same benefits.  
20 In time it might again, if the pendulum swings again, but I  
21 don't foresee that happening.

22 But I think that the other -- to put this in further  
23 perspective, I don't know if people really appreciate how diffi-  
24 cult it is to work against the Soviets. When we have a major  
25 leakage in the Government, and I will refer to one case which

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1 involved some government documents which have fallen into the  
2 hands of the opposition, for a number of years they would take  
3 those documents and then falsify either a cover letter of an  
4 American official to another official, and float that document  
5 in the third world. And the attachments would be bona fide.  
6 They were actually military documents on weaponry, whereas  
7 the thrust of the entire operation was disinformation, total  
8 fabrication.

9 We could identify in our holdings the American documents  
10 which were authentic, the attachments. When we tried to work  
11 on the case, and even coming to the original recipients, it ran  
12 into over 800 names or more, without going down to all of the  
13 Xeroxes that were made of those documents, or all of the people  
14 who were not listed as recipients in different offices.

15 On the Soviet side, if there is a leakage, they can pinpoint  
16 very rapidly that there were only two or three people who knew  
17 the secret, and that one of them was in the west. So the problem  
18 that they have in terms of filling in the holes are relatively  
19 simple under their system, because they have every bigot list  
20 in terms of the need to know. So if there is a leakage, as  
21 there was in one of our biggest cases, the Popov case, which was  
22 the speech of Zhukov in Germany, and immediately it centered or  
23 focused attention on our agent, and that document went through  
24 the hands of George Blake in Berlin. So all he did was tell  
25 his case officer, Soviet, that he saw the speech, a copy of the

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1 speech that Zhukov gave to the General Staff in Germany, all they  
2 had to do was look as to which of their officers had access, was  
3 in the west, and that had to be our agent.

4 Mr. Wallach. Now, I think, although I am personally quite  
5 interested in what you're talking about, it would be a better  
6 matter to raise --

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, you asked me the original question to  
8 try to define the intercept program. Unless you understand  
9 what the state of the art is, I mean, it would be difficult for  
10 you to put as high an evaluation on it as we do, or as the  
11 SB Division gave it in the times when they were first set up  
12 as a geographic unit.

13 Mr. Wallach. Well, let me at this time continue, so that  
14 without marking for the time being, and without asking you to  
15 read the whole thing, because it is twelve pages, and there's  
16 only one or two sections of it I would like you to look at, is  
17 Annex 2 of the Inspector General's survey of the Office of  
18 Security, which is dated in 1960, and I'll just give this to  
19 you. And the bottom of the first page is not that clear, but  
20 we're not going to go to that.

21 Mr. Angleton. This was 1960?

22 Mr. Wallach. Yes, sir.

23 As a matter of fact, why don't I mark this as Exhibit 4,  
24 the above-described document, which is an annex to and is 12  
25 pages.

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(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 4  
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1 Mr. Wallach. And since that is stamped Top Secret, we  
2 will classify the entire transcript as Top Secret.

3 Mr. Angleton. I am just scanning this. I have not seen it  
4 before.

5 Mr. Wallach. Right.

6 As I said before, I have a couple of specific questions and  
7 you can read those paragraphs.

8 Mr. Angleton. I am unaware of the first Recommendation A.  
9 I am aware of the Recommendation B. I have not seen this  
10 document before.

11 Mr. Wallach. I realize you've only had quick opportunity  
12 to just skim it at this time.

13 Did you in your capacity as Chief of Counterintelligence  
14 have occasion to get any input from the Inspector General's  
15 office from surveys?

16 Mr. Angleton. On occasion.

17 Mr. Wallach. I, for example, was told by someone else  
18 that this was held by the Office of Security, and you'll see  
19 there's a later one here, an IG survey of the CI staff that  
20 at least one or two people I have spoken to who were involved  
21 at that time had no occasion to get any feedback from this, and  
22 I was wondering if you at your level had, after a review was  
23 made, be it through the Office of Security, about a project  
24 that was essentially CI's, did have feedback from this?

25 Mr. Angleton. I think the only feedback was on the question

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1 of the cover story.

2 Mr. Wallach. And I have a couple of documents here that I  
3 think you've probably seen recently that I'll show you again.  
4 But, for example, and there are a couple of specific questions I  
5 have.

6 In the second paragraph of this, the IG report annex  
7 states, "the activity cannot be called a 'project' in the usual  
8 sense because it was never processed through the approval  
9 system and has no separate funds." And then it goes on to  
10 explain that the various components involved have been carrying  
11 out the responsibility as a part of their normal staff functions.

12 And really, all I want to get is an understanding of what  
13 they mean, if you know, by approval system.

14 Mr. Angleton. Well, the approval system would have meant  
15 that this would have had to go to a great number of components  
16 who would have to sign off on it, and it would receive tremendous  
17 dissemination in the Agency.

18 Mr. Wallach. That, at least to me, seems the opposite  
19 of a highly sensitive operation.

20 Mr. Angleton. That is the reason I think it was excepted  
21 from it, and that way it short circuited the normal project  
22 approval process.

23 Mr. Wallach. In other words, from approval, they're not  
24 talking about going straight up to the Director. They are talking  
25 about laterally going out?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Yes, more or less. When a project is  
2 conceived, it might cut across many jurisdictions to begin with,  
3 I mean different geographic divisions and so on, so there would  
4 have to be a signoff by the various components, and then it would  
5 go before a project review board, which again the members would  
6 be drawn from many parts of the clandestine services, and I  
7 mean, you would have this tremendous opening up of the activity  
8 to a great number of people.

9 Mr. Wallach. But it would just seem to me -- obviously  
10 my knowledge of the Agency is limited -- that this would entirely  
11 be, you know, again kind of totally against the grain of any  
12 sort of need to know concept.

13 Are you saying it is not because the components usually  
14 involved would have some need to know?

15 Mr. Angleton. No. Because of the fact that it involved  
16 Security, it involved ourselves, in the SA Division, and since  
17 the Director and everybody concerned were so familiar with it,  
18 it was very easy to exempt it from the project system.

19 Mr. Wallach. Who would make a determination as to what  
20 could be exempted and what could not be exempted?

21 Mr. Angleton. Oh, the Deputy Director probably could. I  
22 mean, it would depend on what the operation is. I mean there  
23 could be operations where he himself would not give the exemption,  
24 he'd want the Director to sign off on it.

25 Mr. Wallach. I call your attention to the paragraph

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1 numbered six on page 3. It states, "The principal guidance  
2 furnished to the interception team is the watch list of names  
3 compiled by the CI Staff. The names may be submitted by the  
4 SR Division, the FBI, CI Staff, and the Office of Security.  
5 The list is revised quarterly to remove names no longer of  
6 interest, and it ranges between 300 or 400 names." And then  
7 it just goes on and states, "Headquarters has prepared the  
8 actual watch list intercepts with the photographs of all  
9 exteriors. There has not yet been a case of a watch list item  
10 having been missed by interceptors. Of total items opened,  
11 about one third are on the watch list and the others are  
12 selected at random. Over the years, however, the interceptors  
13 have developed a sixth sense or intuition, and many of the names  
14 on the watch list were placed there as a result of interest  
15 created by the random openings.

16 "A limited amount of guidance is given in the specific  
17 area of topical requirements, but this is not very satisfactory.  
18 The interception team has to rely largely on its own judgment  
19 in the selection of two thirds of the openings, and it should  
20 have more first hand knowledge of the objectives and plans of  
21 operational components which levy the requirements. Information  
22 is now filtered through several echelons, and is more or less  
23 sterile by the time it is received in New York."

24 And I don't really want to take argument with this or not.  
25 My real question is whether or not this was really conveyed

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1 to you, because at least from the people I have interviewed and  
2 talked to, including numerous of the intercept people, they  
3 really felt left out in the cold in certain circumstances, and  
4 there was no feedback at all on the operation.

5 And here I think we have a kind of a recommendation, although  
6 it may not be formalized and per se a recommendation, where they  
7 are saying let's give them more guidance. I just really want to  
8 know if this was brought to your attention, for example.

9 Mr. Angleton. Well I was never aware that anyone in the  
10 operation felt that he was not getting guidance, and as I say,  
11 I have not, to my knowledge, I've never seen this report. The  
12 only thing I've ever seen on it is a memorandum that starts off  
13 something about the IG report, and it got into the whole question  
14 of the cover story.

15 Mr. Wallach. One last reference on this, Mr. Angleton,  
16 on page 11, the paragraph numbered 13, it begins, "Operational  
17 evaluation should include an assessment of overall potential.  
18 It is improbable that anyone inside Russia would wittingly  
19 send or receive mail containing anything of obvious intelligence  
20 or political significance."

21 Then it continues on, including comments to the effect  
22 that certain innocent statements can have intelligence  
23 significance, such as prices, crop conditions, etc., that goes  
24 by censorship. But that really doesn't seem to vitiate the  
25 first sentence, at least, which was it's improbable that anyone

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1 inside Russia would wittingly send or receive mail containing  
2 anything of obvious intelligence or political significance.

3 Mr. Angleton. I don't think that is accurate, though.

4 Mr. Wallach. That's what I was going to ask you.

5 Mr. Angleton. I don't think that's accurate. I think  
6 that the case, one that we could cite is the case of one of  
7 Hammer's illegitimate sons came over here. He had previously  
8 been identified to us as KGB. And I don't know if you are  
9 familiar with that whole period of the New Economic Policies in  
10 the '20s, but in any event, many industrialists put their all,  
11 so to speak, in Russia, had second families and illegitimate  
12 children. The project of the net was run by Derjinski under  
13 Lenin's order. Derjinski was head of the OGPU, and the purpose  
14 of it was the improvement of capitalists on a broad basis, and  
15 it was one of the foundations of the entire field of Lenin's  
16 strategy, which to our way of thinking has been resuscitated  
17 as a result of de-Stalinization.

18 But anyway, he went to New York. He was acknowledged  
19 by the family and he wrote a great number of letters back, all  
20 of which we intercepted. Now, we know he is a staff officer  
21 in KGB and his ostensible assignment here was to write on the  
22 Kennedy assassination, which is a recurring theme among KGB  
23 people, i.e., a right wing conspiracy, etc.

24 Now, all of this went to the Bureau. I am not saying how  
25 much coverage was given to him. And I would say that a great

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1 deal of this information has been acquired here, has not been  
2 put into operational or investigative -- it has not been  
3 exploited. But that has a lot to do with the cadres and the  
4 amount of personnel that is involved.

5 The same goes for one of the biggest cases that's engaged  
6 practically all western intelligence, is Victor Luis, and that  
7 whole history and background.

8 Mr. Wallach. I think I understand you're taking argument.

9 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I take argument because these people,  
10 or whoever made those comments simply was not aware of the  
11 cases that were of interest.

12 Mr. Wallach. Well, that really goes to the heart of my  
13 question. Here we have a group that's really theoretically  
14 reviewing projects and making recommendations, and in one respect  
15 they're supposed to be the internal reviewing arm of the Agency,  
16 and possibly the General Counsel's office, that whole side of  
17 the Agency, and really from what you said, it doesn't seem  
18 really tuned in, so to speak, as to the value of the project,  
19 and I think that it continues in the '69.

20 I'm not disputing with you at this point that the project  
21 did or did not have value. All I'm saying is that --

22 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, I don't like to have to  
23 defend it in that sense because to begin with, I never had any  
24 meetings with these people, and I see here as a result of the  
25 Inspector General's survey, December '60 --

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1 Mr. Wallach. I think the memorandum you're referring to  
2 is the next memorandum I had that I was going to show you.

3 Mr. Angleton. It is a Security memorandum.

4 Mr. Wallach. But I think there's a subsequent memorandum  
5 following that up from the Deputy Chief of the CI Staff dated  
6 1 February '62, but in any event, all I said, the only point I'm  
7 trying to get at is very truthfully that you seem to have an  
8 internal review that really did not have some sort of under-  
9 standing of the project, and whether or not there was any  
10 really internal review of it at all.

11 Mr. Angleton. Well, the point where I have to be very  
12 careful is, I don't know whether they interviewed my own people,  
13 you see. I mean, they interviewed <sup>Burch</sup> Bert O'Neal, Scotty Miler.  
14 If they did, I am unaware of it. If they did, I am unaware of  
15 it, but again, the only notification I see, the only thing I  
16 see in Counterintelligence is this memorandum from Security  
17 dealing only with the cover programs, nothing here on the  
18 question of guidance.

19 Mr. Wallach. What is your understanding of the reasons  
20 behind the Inspector General's survey of the various  
21 projects?

22 Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way. I would  
23 imagine there would always be a reluctance on the part of  
24 everyone to have an office, a Security Office, an IG report  
25 ever go to any other component. That would be very unusual.

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1 It was generally accepted in the Agency, and I think quite  
2 rightly, that the Office of Security has to be completely sealed  
3 off from all other elements in the Agency, I mean in terms of their  
4 internal workings.

5 Mr. Wallach. In other words, a review might have been  
6 made --

7 Mr. Angleton. No. They should have extracted, from our  
8 way of thinking, they should have extracted that memorandum,  
9 that part of it, and sent it to us.

10 Mr. Wallach. Well, that's all I was trying to --

11 Mr. Angleton. But they may have done so, but I have never  
12 seen it, and I cannot believe that it would have gone to my  
13 people whose really -- who are really making quite a fuss about  
14 it, as they did on the cover program.

15 Now, it may have been an oversight, I don't know. I  
16 can't reconstruct -- what was the date on this again?

17 Mr. Wallach. It's in 1960, sir. The exact date is back  
18 at the office, but it's a 1960 survey.

19 Did you know Mr. Thomas Abernathy?

20 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

21 Mr. Wallach. Let me give you a two page memorandum and  
22 mark it as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No.  
5 for identification.)

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(Angleton Exhibit No. 5 will be  
found in the files of the  
Committee.)

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1 Mr. Wallach. Apparently Mr. Abernathy prepared, subsequent  
2 to this Inspector General's report in the Office of Security,  
3 and I ask you to take a quick look at this. I'm going to have  
4 a couple of questions on Paragraph 3.

5 Mr. Angleton. What was his title then, do you know?

6 Mr. Wallach. Very frankly, no, I do not.

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think it's the same Abernathy  
8 who is now very senior in administration.

9 He must have been on the inspection staff from the way it  
10 reads.

11 Mr. Wallach. Exactly. It refers to recommendations. I  
12 am sure he was on the inspection staff. I just don't know his  
13 title.

14 Mr. Angleton. Where did he ever get a figure that the CI  
15 Staff had about 30 people working on it full time?

16 Mr. Wallach. I don't know. I think we probably should  
17 ask him that. It would seem at least from some of the figures  
18 he has here that he would have at least have attempted to talk  
19 to somebody in CI about a project that was run by CI Staff.

20 Mr. Angleton. I don't know, I don't understand it. I  
21 didn't know there was ever any issue of that sort.

22 Mr. Wallach. In other words, neither Mr. Abernathy nor  
23 Mr. Belmon ever came in to talk to you about it?

24 Mr. Angleton. No.

25 Mr. Wallach. And said we think there's a problem; let's

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1 talk about it?

2 Mr. Angleton. No. They may have talked to Bert O'Neal,  
3 who would be the logical person to come to first.

4 Mr. Wallach. Is Mr. O'Neal still with the Agency?

5 Mr. Angleton. No, he's retired some time ago. I think he's  
6 in the area. But I think again the person who would be most  
7 knowledgeable would be Mr. Miler.

8 Mr. Wallach. I mark now as Exhibit 6 a January 2, 1962  
9 memorandum for Chief, CI Staff, Attention, and the name is  
10 deleted. The subject is Project HTLINGUAL, and it's from the  
11 Deputy Chief, Office of Security. I think that was Mr. White  
12 at that time.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 6  
for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 6 will be  
found in the files of the  
Committee.)

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1 Mr. Wallach. And we'll mark as Exhibit 7 for identification  
2 as 1 February '62 memorandum for the Director, Office of  
3 Security, Subject: Project HTLINGUAL. This is from the  
4 Deputy Chief, CI Staff.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 7  
for identification.)  
(Angleton Exhibit No. 7 will  
be found in the files of the  
Committee.)

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1 Mr. Wallach. And I believe that these are two memoranda  
2 regarding the cover story for the project that Mr. Angleton had  
3 referred to before.

4 Mr. Angleton. Let me just see if I have a memo here which  
5 says where it originated at.

6 Mr. Wallach. I think your memorandum might not have the  
7 name blocked out like ours. It is fairly easy to trace in  
8 certain circumstances, and in others it is more difficult.

9 (Pause)

10 Mr. Angleton. This originally went to Mr. John Mertz, who  
11 was my Executive Officer.

12 Mr. Wallach. He was at one time the project chief, was  
13 he not?

14 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I think so. Yes, he was the project  
15 chief.

16 Mr. Wallach. You're talking about the January 11th  
17 memorandum went to John Mertz?

18 Do you recall ever discussing it with him on or about  
19 January 11, '62?

20 Mr. Angleton. I did not discuss it with him. He prepared  
21 on 1 February '62 the answer. The project, actually, the head  
22 of the project at that time was a man called Chalmers.

23 Mr. Wallach. You say Mr. Mertz prepared the 1 February  
24 '62 memorandum?

25 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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1 Mr. Wallach. He prepared it under the signature of the  
2 Deputy Chief, CI Staff?

3 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

4 Mr. Wallach. Who would that have been at that time?

5 Mr. Angleton. His name was James R. Hunt.

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever discussing this cover  
7 story in the early '60s, '62, or the need for a cover story?

8 Mr. Angleton. I can't recall that. We had a major defector  
9 in December '61, and I think from then on for a year or so that  
10 was about my <sup>only</sup> own preoccupation, but I do not recall this -- I  
11 mean, I have read it since.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you think that in today's time there would  
13 be consideration given to a cover story such as this as was  
14 considered in the early '60s?

15 Mr. Angleton. Well, you see, your report says a memorandum  
16 for CI staff. The actual thing is for Chief, CI Staff, Attention:  
17 Mr. Mertz.

18 Mr. Wallach. Yes. I think this says attention CI, also  
19 and his name is blocked out.

20 Mr. Angleton. I didn't see that.

21 Mr. Wallach. I am saying it did or did not get to you.  
22 You say it didn't, and that is a matter of record. But the  
23 memorandum which Mr. Mertz sent in reply under Mr. Hunt's  
24 signature really in Paragraph 5 states, "It is most important  
25 that all Federal law enforcement and U.S. intelligence agencies

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1 vigorously deny any association, direct or indirect, with any  
2 such activity as charged." And his stated reason is that since  
3 no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the  
4 violation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction  
5 of any legal excuse for such violation, it must be recognized  
6 that no cover story is available to any government agency.

7 And then it goes on to say, "In the event of a compromise,  
8 this position should be made known immediately to the Postmaster  
9 General. He is fully knowledgeable of the project."

10 And I would like to stop there and ask you if you have  
11 any knowledge that the then Postmaster General, I think it was  
12 Mr. Day, was fully knowledgeable of the project.

13 Mr. Angleton. Well, do you have a paper that deals with  
14 any meetings with Day before this?

15 Mr. Wallach. Well, I have a paper that Mr. Helms wrote  
16 that I think you have.

17 Mr. Angleton. That was before this?

18 Mr. Wallach. A 1961 paper, sir, in which it says, "withheld  
19 no relevant details."

20 Very truthfully, Mr. Helms does not recall whether or not  
21 he told Mr. Day what -- well, in essence he doesn't recall  
22 what was held -- what no relevant detail meant. He doesn't  
23 recall what he told him, and there is a later CCI project  
24 note in '74, or '73, I am sorry, which again says Mr. Helms  
25 really leaves some doubt as to what he meant.

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1 I am just wondering if you had any knowledge.

2 Obviously Mr. Mertz did, but I was wondering if you did,  
3 whether the Postmaster General was fully knowledgeable of the  
4 project.

5 Mr. Angleton. No, that would be speculation, but I would  
6 have thought that Mr. Helms would have told him everything, for  
7 the simple reason that he knew him quite well outside government.

8 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Day?

9 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean, I met him at Helms' house. He  
10 seemed to be a friend of the family.

11 Mr. Wallach. Was there a reason why certain Postmasters  
12 General would have been told and certain would not have been  
13 told? I think there were three or four between Mr. Day and  
14 Mr. Blount?

15 Mr. Angleton. I don't know the reasoning one way or  
16 another, but I think that behind all of it was that the  
17 Postmaster General in those days was also at the very top in  
18 terms of the party in power.

19 Mr. Wallach. You mean a Cabinet official?

20 Mr. Angleton. Yeah. It was the standard sinecure for  
21 the campaign head of the party.

22 Mr. Wallach. So was Mr. O'Brien after that, Mr. Gronouski?

23 Mr. Angleton. I am saying in Day's case that I would have  
24 thought that everything was told to him about the project. I  
25 can't see any reason going over and seeing him unless he was

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1 given very full disclosure, but that again is my own speculation,  
2 plus, fortified by the line in Dick's memorandum -- would you  
3 mind recalling it to me?

4 Mr. Wallach. "Withheld no relevant details."

5 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

6 Mr. Wallach. Just getting into the fact of a cover story  
7 here, in essence it seems that Mr. Mertz's replying to the  
8 memorandum that was sent to him saying, the hell, we can't  
9 have a cover story here, we've just got to deny, you know, any  
10 participation in it!

11 Mr. Angleton. I agree with his conclusions.

12 Mr. Wallach. All right. I guess I don't see any more point  
13 to go into that.

14 Mr. Angleton. It is possible that Hunt might have discussed  
15 it with me, and this is one month after that defection, and that  
16 was a full time, seven day a week business.

17 I also note here in passing that the memorandum of  
18 20 December '62 from Sheffield Edwards to Deputy Director,  
19 Support, subject: Inspection of Office of Security by  
20 Inspector General -- it goes on and refers to Recommendation  
21 41A of Inspector General's report and subsequent evaluation, and  
22 to the subsequent evaluation of HTLINGUAL. "In connection with  
23 the above-mentioned evaluation, this is to advise you that the  
24 project has been thoroughly reviewed by all interested Agency  
25 components. This review has resulted in the conclusion that the

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1 project is of value to the Agency's overall mission in the  
2 collection of intelligence, and as such, it should be continued."

3 Mr. Wallach. But that really doesn't go -- still doesn't  
4 go to what I was going to before, that you were informed after  
5 interviewing certain people that there were certain problems.  
6 I realize you may have been preoccupied with certain other  
7 things.

8 Mr. Angleton. I mean I am simply stating that there must  
9 have been some meetings that were held which I don't see any  
10 record of between the Office of Security and our project  
11 people.

12 Mr. Wallach. Well, I take it that after the first couple  
13 of months, that this project really held no value per se for the  
14 Office of Security. It was primarily of value to the CI Staff.

15 Mr. Angleton. Quite the contrary, I think that it was  
16 of value to the Office of Security. I think that they built  
17 up their own files and records on the whole thing. They had  
18 a very first rate research and analysis group that had a lot  
19 to do with their responsibilities on employment and distribution  
20 of employees. So there was a great deal turned up in the  
21 project that related to organizations and things of this sort.

22 Mr. Wallach. Along those lines, are you aware that any  
23 time of one of the categories of mail that was requested to  
24 be intercepted and opened was mailed to or from elected or  
25 appointed U.S. officials?

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1 Mr. Angleton. Well, I know there is a memorandum, and it  
2 may be well after the event that forbids it.

3 Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about the December 1971  
4 memorandum?

5 Mr. Angleton. I don't know which one.

6 Mr. Wallach. Well, let me get that out, Mr. Angleton,  
7 because I think a clear reading of that will make it obvious  
8 that it is not forbidden. The only thing that happens as a  
9 result of that memorandum is that separate procedures are set  
10 up, and I think I have a copy here for you. If it is not the  
11 one we are referring to, we can look at the other one, and I  
12 would like to mark the 22nd December 1971 memorandum as  
13 Exhibit 8, and the subject is Handling of Items to or from  
14 Elected or Appointed U.S. Officials.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 8  
for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 8 will  
be found in the files of the  
Committee.)

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1 Mr. Wallach. I would ask you if this is the item you were  
2 referring to.

3 (Pause)

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, first, I don't know what prompted this,  
5 I mean, what prompted their --

6 Mr. Wallach. Well, let me see if I can refresh your  
7 recollection, but first let me ask if this is a document that  
8 you were referring to before?

9 Mr. Angleton. It is the same document.

10 Mr. Wallach. Would you agree with me that it does not  
11 preclude the intercepting or opening of mail to or from elected  
12 or appointed U. S. officials?

13 Mr. Angleton. Yes. In Paragraph 1(b)

14 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever discussing this matter?

15 Mr. Angleton. It is possible, but it doesn't stick out.

16 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anything ever called special  
17 category items or special file that's referred to in Paragraph  
18 F, that would be set up?

19 Mr. Angleton. Not necessarily, but I mean, it wouldn't  
20 surprise me.

21 Mr. Wallach. One doesn't exist.

22 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, normally in all projects,  
23 as they developed they would always be something that is pushed  
24 aside that is very sensitive.

25 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Rocca was at this time your Deputy, was

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1 he not?

2 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

3 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time Mr. Rocca calling  
4 to your attention that a large number of communications to  
5 Senators Church and Kennedy had been picked up and that this  
6 might not be a great idea to disseminate it throughout the  
7 Agency or to the Bureau, and that there may be a need for a  
8 different procedure once the material reached headquarters?

9 Does that ring a bell at all?

10 Mr. Angleton. Who were the two?

11 Mr. Wallach. Senators Kennedy and Church, and also a  
12 Congressman, I can't remember his name now. The last name  
13 begins with a "G" I believe. And apparently   
14 who was the Chief of the project at this time, passed these on  
15 to Mr. Rocca because he thought they were interesting, or for  
16 whatever reason, and Mr. Rocca --

17 Mr. Angleton. Was that something he wrote on a pink  
18 cover sheet and holographed, to your knowledge?

19 Mr. Wallach. I don't know, sir, very truthfully, sir.

20 It outlines the same question you raised, what precipitated  
21 this memorandum, it took a month and a half of investigating to  
22 find out that there was a special files category that did exist  
23 and that there were previous memoranda that for one reason or  
24 another the Agency had not given to us, although they were  
25 requested, and we made a priority request again yesterday

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1 morning.

2 Mr. Angleton. Well, the special category doesn't surprise  
3 me because certain letters such as that Hammer business, and  
4 Philby and a few other things, would go into -- I mean, would  
5 be segregated, because there would be a lot of collateral  
6 probably attached to it.

7 Mr. Wallach. I'm not disagreeing with you, but it is my  
8 understanding that all of the special category items included  
9 was mail to or from appointed or elected U.S. officials, or at  
10 least a special category or file, so there may have been other  
11 special files, and I think we've had testimony that insofar  
12 as this project was concerned, except for the occasional hot  
13 item that might be sent directly to someone higher, that this  
14 was the only special procedure set up, and it was precipitated  
15 as a result of correspondence coming in that was described  
16 before.

17 I think if you remember, that was back at the time of  
18 Vietnam, and we mentioned Congress was acting on that, and I  
19 believe Senator Church was just taking a tour and was receiving  
20 correspondence.

21 I don't want to say that I know exactly what's in that  
22 file, because I don't.

23 Mr. Angleton. No, well, I mean, I am unaware that although  
24 I want to see here -- well, I don't know.

25 Mr. Wallach. I have been told that there was an August 30,

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1 '71 memorandum which precipitated this, and just for your  
2 information you might want to ask to see that.

3 Mr. Angleton. August?

4 Mr. Wallach. August 30, 1971 memorandum. We do not have  
5 a copy of it, otherwise I would show it to you.

6 As Exhibit 9 for identification I would like to ask a one  
7 page letter dated January 13, 1971 -- I'm sorry, it is a two  
8 page letter, but really, before I do that, I would like to ask  
9 Mr. Angleton to focus his attention on a time that has become  
10 more clear in more recent months, when Mr. Cotter became Chief  
11 of the Inspection Service.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 9  
for identification.)

(Angleton Exhibit No. 9 will  
be found in the files of the  
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1 Mr. Wallach. Really what I'm going to be getting into now  
2 is, although it took four years, the termination of the project  
3 and the events that happened during that time, and if we could  
4 focus our attention on that.

5 What is the first time that you recall, Mr. Angleton, that  
6 you recall there was any consideration being given to really  
7 terminating the project?

8 Mr. Angleton. It came up more than once, and it usually  
9 came up as a result of somebody who was a contact of Security  
10 going to Security and telling them that they had better have  
11 new principals or they had a change of some sort, they wanted  
12 reassurance.

13 Mr. Wallach. What do you mean by new principals?

14 Mr. Angleton. A new Postmaster General, basically that. I  
15 mean there would be a change of people at the top.

16 Mr. Wallach. Well, you say it happened more than once.  
17 You mean it happened more than once in the life of the project?

18 You're talking about the period -- we're talking  
19 about --

20 Mr. Angleton. I'm talking about through the life of the  
21 project, I mean, if there were any changes in the Post Office  
22 or something, there would be concern expressed that those  
23 people should be briefed.

24 Mr. Wallach. Was there concern, if you know, that the  
25 Postmaster should be briefed that the CIA had a mail cover,

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1 mail opening going on so the Postmaster didn't stumble upon it  
2 and make an inquiry or just to tell him that there was a mail  
3 opening going on? I think there is a difference, in my mind,  
4 and I don't think we have any hard evidence that any Postmaster  
5 General up to Mr. Blount was ever told, and I can see reasons  
6 for both types of concerns, but the first one would almost make  
7 more sense to me, because the Postal Inspectors in New York knew  
8 that mail was being provided. Some of the clerks knew the  
9 mail was being provided. In fact, one worked in the operation.

10 But there is doubt that any of them knew that mail was  
11 actually being opened; such is their testimony. It would almost  
12 seem to make more sense to brief the Postmaster General, yes,  
13 we have this intercept, and it's not in accordance with the  
14 usual procedures, but we are just covering the mail and, you know,  
15 we just wanted to let you know about that.

16 And I really, when I ask if you know either way of whether  
17 that was the concern, or the concern was to tell them that we  
18 were opening mail.

19 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, I cannot remember specifically.  
20 I never attended any meeting with the Postmasters, and the  
21 memorandum, though, well it came back, were fairly general.  
22 There wasn't any detailed memorandum of the conversation, as  
23 I recall it, but there's no question, though, through the life  
24 of the project, the question of continuing it or not came up  
25 from time to time.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Aside from the question of continuing it,  
2 was there any difference of degree in that question after Mr.  
3 Cotter came on board as the Chief Postal Inspector, say from  
4 '69 on?

5 Mr. Angleton. When did he come on board?

6 Mr. Wallach. April, 1969.

7 Mr. Angleton. I don't know, really. I mean, he obviously  
8 was much more sophisticated, he'd been in Security, and I think in  
9 many ways he was probably more conscious of the flap.

10 Mr. Wallach. On the other hand, because he was in Security,  
11 and because he had been assigned in the mid-'50s to the  
12 Manhattan field office, he did know that mail was being  
13 opened.

14 I don't know if you are aware of that or not.

15 Mr. Angleton. Well, I knew that he at some stage knew  
16 it.

17 Mr. Wallach. In any event, he did know that mail was  
18 being opened. I don't know if he knew the dimensions of the  
19 project because it had grown since '55 or whatever, approximately  
20 '56, when he was there, but in any event, he did know, he was  
21 back at Headquarters for a time, and then before he went over,  
22 word bubbled up again, the project was continuing. So, I  
23 think you really don't know anything about what his concern  
24 was, or you never really discussed that?

25 Mr. Angleton. I don't think -- my understanding is his

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1 concern was the extent to which he would be compromised, I mean,  
2 his job would be compromised in the Post Office, and he always  
3 wanted some kind of laying on of hands, that is, the Director  
4 seeing the Postmaster General and making sure that there was  
5 some kind of touching of base there. That is my general  
6 impression of Cotter's concern.

7 Mr. Wallach. Is that essentially -- I'm not trying to  
8 put words in your mouth -- that he was trying to protect himself  
9 to make sure that his boss knew?

10 Mr. Angleton. Yes, I think so. I mean, that is my  
11 impression. I mean, I read the papers about his appearances  
12 and so on, and I don't bear him any ill will for his statements.  
13 I mean, I think all throughout he was torn about this project.  
14 He was very ill at ease with it, and I think he -- that his  
15 position was very difficult.

16 Mr. Wallach. I would like to get from you, as best you  
17 can, if you remember the sequence until the termination, and  
18 we have a couple of documents here. I'm sure that these are  
19 documents that you have seen and you do have, but in any event,  
20 I will show them to you, but I would like to get at your  
21 memory now as to what happened in general terms.

22 Mr. Angleton. On the termination?

23 Mr. Wallach. The events leading to the termination.

24 Mr. Angleton. Well, what I recall simply is again a  
25 meeting had occurred, I think, while Helms was still Director,

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1 regarding the question of Cotter, and it was decided to still  
2 go ahead with the project. I can't remember whether there were  
3 any recommendations about seeing anybody at this moment.

4 Subsequently, when Dr. Schlesinger came aboard, Cotter  
5 did raise a very strong issue with the Office of Security, and  
6 he coupled it with sort of an ultimatum that if certain steps  
7 were not taken, that he would abandon the operation, and I was  
8 not present, and the ultimatum was presented to Dr. Schlesinger,  
9 and I assume it was Osborn who signed, or somebody. So the  
10 issue was drawn.

11 There was to have been a meeting on this in which there would  
12 be arguments presented to Dr. Schlesinger. Then something  
13 happened there. It was the same day, I think, that Colby was  
14 made the Deputy Director for Operations, to succeed Karamessines.  
15 So the meeting did not take place which had been scheduled,  
16 and Colby wrote an opinion about doing away with the operation.

end 2b

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1 In my argument, I induced him to go to a meeting that I  
2 had scheduled on another subject with the Director and so I  
3 pre-empted some of the time in Colby's presence to put up  
4 another argument to the Director to the effect that in my  
5 opinion the President had a vested interest in this.

6 Mr. Wallach. You say the President?

7 Mr. Angleton. Yes. And I say the decision -- I mean, I  
8 questioned that the Director of Central Intelligence could do  
9 away with the project, without it being a decision of the  
10 Executive.

11 Mr. Wallach. Was the President aware of the project?

12 Mr. Angleton. Well, can I come back to your question?  
13 I'm just trying to recount what I recall here.

14 Mr. Wallach. Go ahead.

15 Mr. Angleton. Because I felt that there was really grounds  
16 for very deep examination of the value of it, its value to the  
17 Bureau and ourselves, and he, in effect told me and he told  
18 Colby also that he would be very pleased, or words to that  
19 effect, to consult the President, and he overruled his  
20 previous ruling with Colby about closing it down and instructed  
21 Colby to get word through to Cotter that if he would hold off  
22 on his ultimatum that he would consult with higher authority,  
23 and this word was passed through Colby to Security who, in turn,  
24 talked to Cotter and he refused to do it and it was closed down  
25 that evening.

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1 Mr. Wallach. I take it one of the things and what do you  
2 say, was it Mr. Colby who was in favor of closing it down?

3 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

4 Mr. Wallach. Is that because of his general non-predisposi-  
5 tion to counterintelligence, or were there other reasons,  
6 specifically, with this project?

7 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that -- I mean, I don't want  
8 to try to put thoughts into how his mind was, but I think that  
9 the whole Watergate business, the way it was handled, by taking  
10 all of the documents and simply throwing them all over the  
11 White House and everything, out of the Agency, which has gone  
12 on ever since, that this was part and parcel of his own, I mean,  
13 what he had decided he was going to do. In other words, there  
14 would be a hurried-up meeting which Dick Ober and myself would be  
15 called over there and without any explanation be requested to furnish  
16 all kinds of documents. There is to my knowledge, I don't think  
17 mine or Ober's were even logged in or logged out. It was one of  
18 these crash things where somebody was standing in the same room  
19 waiting until all those xeroxes were made and then rushing them  
20 over to the White House. So that was the general atmosphere of  
21 the period.

22 Mr. Wallach. Well, I'd like to focus more particularly on  
23 the question of have you had any discussions with Mr. Colby and  
24 did he have any specific reason why he wanted to close the  
25 project down? Did he ever discuss it that he thought it wasn't

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1 legal?

2 Mr. Angleton. Oh, yes, very definitely.

3 Mr. Wallach. Therefore he was worried about sort of the  
4 flap potential, so to speak?

5 Mr. Angleton. Oh, yes.

6 Mr. Wallach. And I take it that his estimate of the value  
7 of the project was quite different than yours?

8 Mr. Angleton. He never mentioned that to me. I saw a  
9 comment to the effect where it stated that Dr. Schlesinger did  
10 not feel that the product was worth the risk. He never made  
11 that statement to me, in fact, he was quite prepared to take it  
12 up to the President, if Cotter had held off.

13 Mr. Wallach. What was Mr. Schlesinger's initial, then,  
14 reason for sending out the memorandum cutting off the project  
15 or instructing Mr. Colby to do so?

16 Mr. Angleton. I don't know if I've seen that memorandum.  
17 Was there a memorandum of that sort? I didn't think so.

18 Mr. Wallach. It's a good time to mark this and we can take  
19 a look at it, as Exhibit 10. It's a one-page document dated  
20 28 February '73 which is actually an official routing slip.  
21 10A, a one-page memorandum dated February 15, 1973, signed by  
22 Mr. Colby.

23 10B, a one-page document dated February 14, 1973.

24 Mr. Angleton. What was the date on Mr. Colby's?

25 Mr. Wallach. February 15th, and this is February 14th. I'll

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4  
1 give you these in just a moment.

2 It's entitled "Talking Paper, subject, Mail Intercept  
3 Program".

4 And as Exhibit 10C, a thirteen-page excerpt from documents  
5 entitled "The Project." It is referred to in the memorandum  
6 of February 13, 1973.

(The documents referred  
to were marked Angleton  
Exhibits 10, 10A, 10B  
and 10C respectively for  
identification.)

(The documents will be  
found in the files of  
the Committee.)

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1 Mr. Angleton. This buck sheet from Colby is dated 20  
2 February, and I assume that is what is attached to all of this.

3 Mr. Wallach. To be very honest with you, Mr. Angleton,  
4 I am not positive that it was attached. This is the way we  
5 got it, and I'm not sure that it totally makes sense in this  
6 fashion.

7 Do you have copies of these memoranda in your files?

8 Mr. Angleton. I have.

9 The facts are that the Bureau informally was canvassed by  
10 me. From the informal reaction, it was quite obvious that  
11 all of these proposals for passing the project over to the FBI  
12 were not realistic.

13 Mr. Wallach. Who did you talk to there?

14 Mr. Angleton. To one of the senior officers.

15 Mr. Wallach. You won't mention his name?

16 Mr. Angleton. I don't think it is necessary, because he  
17 didn't take it up to higher authority, but he was senior enough  
18 to know the Bureau's feelings about matters of this sort.

19 Mr. Wallach. What did he tell you the Bureau's feelings  
20 were?

21 Mr. Angleton. He simply stated, forget it. They didn't  
22 have the personnel to handle this type of thing, and so on.  
23 But I understood this from so many other things of the Bureau  
24 over the years, I mean, Mr. Hoover was opposed to bringing  
25 aboard as Bureau officers people who were not active. He didn't

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1 want a lot of translators and so on and so on.

2 Mr. Wallach. This was after Mr. Hoover, was it not?

3 Mr. Angleton. Yes. This was after, but I think the  
4 judgments he had on these things were -- I mean, everyone agreed  
5 to them and there was no problem for me to understand the  
6 Bureau's position.

7 Mr. Wallach. But going back -- and this may be a difficult  
8 question to ask you, because you say you do not have any  
9 specific knowledge -- but I can tell you that the Bureau did  
10 run numerous mail intercept opening projects at different  
11 points in time.

12 Mr. Angleton. But they were connected directly to some-  
13 thing operational. I mean, they had a specific reason for  
14 each thing that they did.

15 Mr. Wallach. What was your understanding of those  
16 projects?

17 Mr. Angleton. What projects?

18 Mr. Wallach. Of the Bureau's?

19 Mr. Angleton. My understanding only is that it was based  
20 specifically on a piece of information regarding some operational  
21 matter of the opposition.

22 In other words, it wasn't a project of this sort.

23 Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about something to the  
24 effect of an indicator?

25 Mr. Angleton. Pardon?

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1 Mr. Wallach. Something like an indicator?  
2 Mr. Angleton. What I mean --  
3 Mr. Wallach. Are you saying you just went after one  
4 person?

5 Mr. Angleton. Well, more or less. Either that or  
6 looking for a category of communication.

7 Mr. Wallach. What you're saying is although it may  
8 have had this same format, it was much narrower in the items  
9 that they picked up.

10 Mr. Angleton. And I assumed that it was very temporary  
11 for the life of that particular internal security matter.

12 Mr. Wallach. You're saying then that you would have no  
13 knowledge of a project that lasted 18 years?

14 Mr. Angleton. No.

15 Mr. Wallach. You're saying of a project, the matter  
16 would run in our particular case for x-number of months?

17 Mr. Angleton. That's right, where they identified the  
18 same agent.

19 Mr. Wallach. But you don't know of any projects that  
20 they used just to try to identify agents?

21 Mr. Angleton. Well, I know of that type of thing but  
22 I thought that that was of relatively short duration. Those  
23 were in the questions of <sup>illegals</sup>legals. I mean where they were trying  
24 to get patterns of communication.

25 Mr. Wallach. Well, when you say short duration, are

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1 you talking about months or years? Well, when you call

2 Mr. Angleton. Well, when you tell me 18 years, I  
3 never dreamed the Bureau would have that kind of operation.

4 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard of the term z coverage?

5 Mr. Angleton. What?

6 Mr. Wallach. Z coverage.

7 Mr. Angleton. I've heard of it, but I didn't know it  
8 was specifically mail.

9 Mr. Wallach. It may have been other things, too.

10 In other words it was not a realistic possibility to  
11 assume the Bureau would take this over?

12 You mean they you went through the formalities of  
13 asking?

14 Mr. Angleton. No, I mean when I called up and asked  
15 this fellow a curbstone opinion as to whether the FBI would  
16 be prepared to take on the Hunter and he just told me to  
17 forget it. Simply they wouldn't be able to man it or to  
18 handle it.

19 Mr. Wallach. Was there any discussion?

20 Mr. Angleton. Of course there would be another policy  
21 reason for that. I don't think the Bureau would get into  
22 an operation of this sort where they would be passing to us  
23 the raw materials. I mean that is again <sup>of</sup> Bureau policy.

24 In other words, we had a different customer's list than  
25 he would have should they take this project on.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who was the Deputy Chief  
2 of CI staff on January 27th, 1961 or 1961 who that would have  
3 been?

4 Mr. Angleton. That would have been Jim Hunt.

5 Mr. Wallach. In the memorandum for the Chief of Operations  
6 EDP that date Mr. Hunt says: "On January 5, 1961, Don  
7 Moore, Deputy to Al Bellmont, very confidentially  
8 advised that they" -- by that "they" he means the Bureau --  
9 "had set up a similar but more limited coverage to examine  
10 mail to certain cities in Europe. Their examination is solely  
11 to look for suspicious letters that might be mailed by  
12 illegal Soviet agents. This coverage has positively located one  
13 GRU illegal channel."

14 (Discussion off the record.)

15 Mr. Angleton. I just wanted to grasp here, I just saw  
16 in one of the memorandums that you referred to --

17 Mr. Wallach. Is that the 27th January, '61 memorandum?

18 Mr. Angleton. No, this is again going back to the  
19 batch of memos --

20 Mr. Wallach. Exhibit 10.

21 Mr. Angleton. Colby and Schlesinger.

22 Mr. Wallach. Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Angleton. There is our presentation for the  
24 project.

25 Mr. Wallach. Is that essentially that paper that you

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1 gave to the Director?

2 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know exactly what stimulated  
3 it, except that it was a paper, I think, prepared to show the  
4 concern of the meeting that we were going to have to take  
5 place. There was supposed to be a meeting with Mr. Austin,  
6 myself, and probably my deputy and Karamessines and so on.  
7 And that was cancelled.

8 But in any event, what I was referring to was in going  
9 through the chronology here on page 3, there is a statement  
10 made on page 3, paragraph C:

11 "Occasional exploratory openings conducted at  
12 secure CIA installation nearby proved so rewarding that continu-  
13 ation on a highly selective basis was deemed necessary  
14 in the national security interest."

15  
16 Now that sequentially in terms of what they're discussing  
17 would have been prior to our taking on the project.

18 Mr. Wallach. But again, this was a document that was  
19 prepared in early '73 or late '72, but probably would have  
20 looked back at other documents to be prepared?

21 Mr. Angleton. It would have been a synthesis of the  
22 holdings on the project probably prepared by Scotty Miler in  
23 February, '73.

24 And since it is a chronology, it is a chronology which  
25 talks about the exploratory openings before it came to counter-

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1 intelligence. This is a feeling I've always had. but --

2 Mr. Wallach. Do you remember Mr. Schlesinger discussing  
3 with you the cost of the operation in terms of actual funds?

4 Mr. Angleton. No. We only talked to the question of  
5 content and the relation to the Bureau. And this was a very  
6 brief discussion.

7 Mr. Wallach. Well, who was getting that performance to  
8 Angleton and reading that January 27, 1961 memorandum, which  
9 talks about Don Moore offering to put CIA names on an FBI  
10 watch list? I was wondering, this sort of cuts against what  
11 you said about the Bureau not conducting any operations like  
12 this.

13 Mr. Angleton. I know that operation you are discussing.  
14 That again was one where it was designed for a very specific  
15 purpose and one purpose alone, and that was to get the pattern  
16 of communications to certain neutral country places before  
17 it went on to Moscow with illegals.

18 Mr. Wallach. Do you know when those projects that you  
19 are talking about ended? Did they end?

20 Mr. Angleton. Well, I say none of this do I know  
21 officially.

22 Mr. Wallach. Well, I realize it's hearsay and it  
23 percolated up, but you, for example, said you can read  
24 intelligence reports and through your experience, as other  
25 people have said, tell us something was received from a

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1 mail intercept.

2 Mr. Angleton. Well, when I say "mail intercept," I  
3 mean --

4 Mr. Wallach. An opening of a letter?

5 Mr. Angleton. An opening of a letter. But it could  
6 also have been a bag job of some sort.

7 But in any event, the precision of what followed was  
8 something that must have come off of a document.

9 Mr. Wallach. Well, did you, for example, note that  
10 this ended when Mr. Hoover died, for example, that the FBI  
11 stopped at least instances of mail openings at that time, or  
12 did you notice any stoppage at all?

13 Mr. Angleton. Nope.

14 Mr. Wallach. You're saying that insofar as you know,  
15 the same mail -- in other words, it continued in the same  
16 pattern that it had always been.

17 Mr. Angleton. Well, you see, I am not cognizant of  
18 any long-term mail opening by the Bureau. But let's take a  
19 simple case. If they were surveilling a man and he put a  
20 letter in a mailbox down at the Post Office, they might have  
21 somebody down behind the counter who "picked up the letter."

22 Mr. Wallach. What I am asking is, really, these types  
23 of incidents you are describing, did you know this, and I  
24 realize this is only from what you gleaned, sir, that it stopped,  
25 for example, when Mr. Hoover died?

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1 Mr. Angleton. No.

2 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you noticed no termination  
3 of this type of thing?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean I do not remember so many  
5 specific things after that anyway. By that time, I mean --

6 Mr. Wallach. Do you remember Mr. Brannigan, for example,  
7 in 1971, sending you some of Jane Fonda's correspondence?

8 Mr. Angleton. That would normally go to the liaison  
9 office, but I don't remember it as such. I know the flap  
10 over Jane Fonda. I mean we were getting stuff from the Bureau  
11 regularly. It came every day.

12 Mr. Wallach. Is there a law <sup>log</sup> which is kept as to which  
13 documents the Bureau supplied?

14 Mr. Angleton. It used to be.

15 Mr. Wallach. When was that stopped?

16 Mr. Angleton. I don't know if it was stopped, but in  
17 '73 I lost the liaison office.

18 But prior to that we had a detailed log with everything  
19 from the Bureau plus the gist of all meetings and discussions  
20 with people in branches and so on.

21 Mr. Wallach. Would that have been in the liaison office?

22 Mr. Angleton. Yes.

23 Mr. Wallach. The log actually physically kept there?

24 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

25 Mr. Wallach. If, for example, the Bureau had, assume,

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1 picked up a piece of Joe X's mail, let's say in '68, and for  
2 any reason on that it wanted to pass this information on  
3 to the CIA, they would not have sent a copy of the letter.  
4 They would have put it into --

5 Mr. Angleton. A report.

6 Mr. Wallach. Into a report.

7 Mr. Angleton. It would be a subject of file with the  
8 information.

9 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if there was a special  
10 liaison set up between Mr. Ober and the Bureau?

11 Mr. Angleton. I think so.

12 Mr. Wallach. Was there one particular person who was  
13 in contact?

14 Mr. Angleton. I imagine Ober himself.

15 Mr. Wallach. At the Bureau, I'm sorry.

16 Mr. Angleton. No, I mean -- oh, he may have had, in  
17 addition to the regular liaison man that came every day, he  
18 probably had liaison with somebody who was a specialist who  
19 was in the field. He was a specialist and that probably in  
20 one stage meant George Moore.

21 Mr. Wallach. If we could for a second turn to Exhibit  
22 10, which is his handwritten official rating slip. I believe  
23 that is your handwriting, is it not?

24 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

25 Mr. Wallach. I have a problem reading it and I wonder

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21 So I told him that I had a meeting at 3:00, that I was  
22 going to contest his memorandum closing down the operation  
23 with Mr. Schlesinger, and I asked him if he would come along  
24 with me at that time because there was a real time factor  
25 involved, which he did.

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1 And so I went up and explained to the Director that  
2 I wanted to protest the decision. And that is when I put  
3 up the proposal and I went through the question of the FBI  
4 and whatnot, and then the suggestion was put up by Mr. Colby  
5 that we could detail all of our personnel over there to the  
6 FBI, which was totally in my view unrealistic because the  
7 people's careers are in our business. And second, I mean the  
8 FBI would never accept such a proposal. It was totally  
9 unrealistic. And that was when I put up the proposition that  
10 prior to the final death of the project, that in my view it  
11 should be raised at the highest executive level as to whether  
12 it should be terminated or not, since, if it was terminated,  
13 it would not be re-opened again. At least give the President  
14 that option.

15 So Dr. Schlesinger turned to Mr. Colby and stated that  
16 he would like him -- that he had reconsidered, that he  
17 would like him to go back to Cotter with the statement of  
18 suspending that for a few days in order that he could take  
19 it up "at the highest level." But he had told both of us  
20 that he was prepared to discuss it with the President and  
21 that's the end of it.

22 Mr. Wallach. I think you've given me a very good  
23 accounting of that. I would just like to have a couple more  
24 questions on two meetings -- I'm sure you've seen these  
25 two memoranda and I would like to mark them as Exhibit 11,

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1 which is a 19 May '71 memorandum on the DCI meeting concerning  
2 HTLINGUAL.

3 You can take a look at that to make sure you've seen it.

4 (The document referred to was  
5 marked Angleton Exhibit No. 11  
6 for identification.)

7 (Angleton Exhibit No. 11 may be  
8 found in the files of the  
9 Committee.)

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Mr. Wallach. And Exhibit 12 is a 3 June 1971 memorandum  
for the record, Subject: Meeting in DCI's office concerning  
HTLINGUAL.

(The document referred to was  
marked Angleton Exhibit No. 12  
for identification.)  
(Angleton Exhibit No. 12 will  
be found in the files of the  
Committee.)

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1 (Pause)

2 Mr. Angleton. I have seen this one.

3 All right, I read that.

4 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention, Mr. Angleton, to the  
5 May 19, 1971 memorandum, I just have a couple of questions.

6 You were present at that meeting, were you not?

7 Mr. Angleton. That's right.

8 Mr. Wallach. And calling your attention to Paragraph 5,  
9 which discusses the theft of FBI documents from Media,  
10 Pennsylvania, do you have any recollection of discussing that  
11 at all, except what is written down here?

12 It doesn't even say that you discussed it, but do you  
13 recall that coming up?

14 Mr. Angleton. No, I really don't recall it. It would not  
15 have surprised me, but I don't think that Karamessines got it  
16 very straight there. I mean, I think he misunderstood something.

17 Mr. Wallach. Why do you say Karamessines?

18 Mr. Angleton. He was the DDP.

19 Mr. Wallach. All right.

20 He states he had been informed.

21 Mr. Angleton. That's it.

22 Mr. Wallach. In the event he may have been informed of  
23 something that is incorrect?

24 Mr. Angleton. There was never to my knowledge the damage  
25 report submitted to the Agency by the FBI as to what materials

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1 of ours were compromised in that Media, Pennsylvania breakin.

2 Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to paragraph 9, sir,  
3 the paragraph numbered 9 on the third page, it states, on the  
4 question of continuance, the DDP stated that he is gravely  
5 concerned for any flap would cause CIA the worst possible  
6 publicity and embarrassment. He opined that the operation should  
7 be done by the FBI because they could better withstand such  
8 publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance.

9 The DS stated that he thought the operation served mainly  
10 an FBI requirement. The CCI countered that the Bureau would  
11 not take over the operation now and could not serve essential  
12 CIA requirements as we have served theirs; that, moreover, CI  
13 staff sees the operation as foreign surveillance.

14 There are a couple of things I would like to discuss  
15 really, you know, first. In there we have the Director of  
16 Security stating that the operation serves mainly an FBI  
17 requirement, and I think throughout my discussions in depositions  
18 of security people, they almost uniformly stated that all they  
19 did was provide the documents, and it really didn't serve any  
20 of their purposes, you know, including past Directors of  
21 Security.

22 I'm just wondering if their feeling seems to differ as  
23 to what you've expressed before as to the benefits that resulted  
24 from this. They feel they were minimal at best.

25 Mr. Angleton. I would have to -- maybe as of the time

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1 spelled out here, that that was their feeling.

2 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any discussions with Mr. Osborn  
3 about this, with Mr. King about this?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, they were present at the meeting. I  
5 mean, Mr. Osborn was.

6 Mr. Wallach. It seems that Mr. Karamessines was also  
7 saying here that this was domestic surveillance, and one of  
8 your responses was that this was foreign surveillance.

9 Could you kind of elaborate on that? Is there really a  
10 distinction?

11 Mr. Angleton. I am not sure, I think that we're both  
12 saying the same things in a way. The -- I think that the basic  
13 thrust of Mr. Karamessines' feeling was the question, to what  
14 extent it had been compromised and whether there would be a  
15 flap, and his thought of passing it over to the FBI, in my  
16 view, it just simply would not fly at all. In other words,  
17 they would not accept it.

18 The Agency was much more qualified in terms of the  
19 product and the handling of it than anybody else, to our way  
20 of thinking, and it was, no question that it served both domestic  
21 and foreign interests, about things, Soviets who came here and  
22 Soviets who returned there.

23 Mr. Wallach. Was there any discussion of it making any  
24 difference as to whether the mail was opened outside the U.S.  
25 as opposed to inside the U.S.?

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begin 3b

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1 Mr. Angleton. Well, those discussions had taken place  
2 at various stages over a long period of time because we obviously  
3 had mail opening benefits. Well, maybe we didn't do it but  
4 we had people who opened mail abroad, and where we got the  
5 product.

6 Mr. Wallach. Was the German operation at Frankfurt, the  
7 German authorities in the army of major benefit to the Agency,  
8 or are you qualified to answer that really?

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that is my general under-  
10 standing.

11 Mr. Wallach. What other specific mail intercept and  
12 opening operations are you aware of that took place within  
13 the United States?

14 Mr. Angleton. Well, I have heard since all of this happened  
15 about the one in New Orleans, the one in San Francisco, and the  
16 one in Honolulu.

17 Mr. Wallach. But during your time at the Agency up until  
18 this became public, you really did not know of anyone besides  
19 the New York Operation.

20 Mr. Angleton. Nope. It's possible that one of my men  
21 may have known it.

22 Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, that TSD or TS in the  
23 San Francisco operation never came to you and said would you  
24 like some of the take from this, take a look at some of the  
25 Chinese stuff.

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1 Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't recall that, although  
2 I say I'm not excluding that they may have gone to Scotty  
3 Miler or somebody and stated that we have this or that. But I  
4 don't think so.

5 Mr. Wallach. In other words, nobody's ever told you that.  
6 You're just saying it could have happened.

7 Mr. Angleton. I mean I don't recall it. I mean when I  
8 saw the intercept or anything broke open is when I learned, I  
9 know specifically, to my own knowledge, about the San Francisco,  
10 and then I was told at that time there were three others.

11 Mr. Wallach. Do you know about any individual instances  
12 of mail intercepts in the United States that you can recall?  
13 I have one memorandum here, and I think we have some others back  
14 there that I did not have time to get, which I will show you;  
15 the 22 November '67 memorandum, which I again might not have  
16 gotten to you. It's to the attention of somebody else whose  
17 name is whited out, which refers to Syrian items.

18 Mr. Angleton. No, I never saw this.

19 Mr. Wallach. You're not aware, I take it, of any coverage  
20 of Middle Eastern mail in the middle or late sixties, when  
21 mail was actually intercepted and opened.

22 Mr. Angleton. No.

23 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard of a project called  
24 SRINDIAN?

25 Mr. Angleton. No.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Are you aware of an operation by which the  
2 mail of certain embassies was opened in the United States,  
3 diplomatic pouches?

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I know it's going on.

5 Mr. Wallach. But the CIA wasn't primarily involved in that?

6 Mr. Angleton. I think they were not done by the Agency.

7 Mr. Wallach. Well, it's hard for me to really recount this  
8 area. It's my understanding that it was.

9 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, I'm not aware of it. I mean,  
10 it doesn't surprise me, mind you, it doesn't surprise me, but  
11 I'm not aware of it.

12 Mr. Wallach. Did you know about it prior to 1974?

13 Mr. Angleton. Well, we've had, going back to OSS days,  
14 we've had operations that were domestic, in the war, all the  
15 way through.

16 Mr. Wallach. Well, I'm really asking from '60 on.

17 Mr. Angleton. I was not aware of the Agency being involved,  
18 but it would not surprise me if some of our people helped the  
19 Bureau or something of this sort.

20 Mr. Wallach. Are you aware of Customs being involved in  
21 that?

22 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean if they're going to do it,  
23 they'd probably have a lot of people involved.

24 Mr. Wallach. Well, what is your understanding of the  
25 project?

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1 Mr. Angleton. I don't know the project. But I mean, I  
2 do know that we had some of the best experts in the community  
3 as far as locks and picks are concerned.

4 Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard of a wax and seals course?

5 Mr. Angleton. A what?

6 Mr. Wallach. A wax and seals course.

7 Mr. Angleton. I know the course.

8 Mr. Wallach. That's flaps and seals. I'm asking you  
9 if you know wax and seals.

10 Mr. Angleton. Well, it's the same. People don't use  
11 wax anymore anyway.

12 Mr. Wallach. Well, I think I have one other question  
13 in the line of questions.

14 Are you aware of any mail intercept projects where the  
15 Bureau cooperated with the Agency or any other agency actually  
16 provided mail to the CIA?

17 Mr. Angleton. No.

18 Mr. Wallach. How about where they provided intelligence  
19 reports that actually contained mail on a continual basis?

20 Mr. Angleton. Like the what?

21 Mr. Wallach. Instead of providing a copy of the mail, they  
22 provided intelligence reports that you were aware contained  
23 mail from a study project, like the thing we mentioned before.

24 Mr. Angleton. No.

25 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you're not aware as to whether

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1 the CIA receives copies of diplomatic mail?

2 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean I know about some mail abroad,  
3 I mean, I don't know specifically but I know there has been.

4 Mr. Wallach. I am talking right now about mail coming to  
5 the United States that's actually opened in the United States.

6 Mr. Angleton. No.

7 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the meeting of June 1, 1971,  
8 which was reflected in the June 3rd, '71 memorandum? I mean,  
9 without reference to that memorandum, really.

10 Mr. Angleton. This is the one about Mitchell and so on?

11 Mr. Wallach. Do you have an independent recollection of  
12 that meeting, Mr. Angleton?

13 Mr. Angleton. I am trying to remember. See, I knew all  
14 about the -- I know everything about the Attorney General on that  
15 point.

16 Mr. Wallach. Well, let me ask you a couple of specific  
17 questions.

18 Do you recall Mr. Helms telling you at that meeting, telling  
19 you that he told Mr. Mitchell that the CIA was opening mail in  
20 New York City?

21 Mr. Angleton. I can't recall it, but my feeling was that  
22 I told that to Mr. Mitchell.

23 Mr. Wallach. When do you think you told that to Mr.  
24 Mitchell?

25 Mr. Angleton. I mean, I didn't tell him, I mean, I showed

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1 him exemplars on some cases.

2 Mr. Wallach. When was that?

3 Mr. Angleton. I cannot give you a date.

4 Mr. Wallach. Was it in connection with the Special Report  
5 involved on the so-called Houston Plan?

6 Mr. Angleton. It might well have been.

7 Mr. Wallach. In any event, you do have a definite  
8 recollection of showing Mr. Mitchell selections?

9 Mr. Angleton. Of course, I took a couple up with me.

10 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall specifically who they were on?

11 Mr. Angleton. <sup>Boudien</sup> Boudien and one on the murder, I believe,  
12 in Maryland, but I think Dick may have seen him subsequently.

13 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what Mr. Mitchell said when you  
14 discussed this with him, if anything?

15 Mr. Angleton. No. I mean, he was very interested.

16 Mr. Wallach. Did he ask about the details of the project  
17 and how long it had been going on and questions like that?

18 Mr. Angleton. I don't think so. I think that the main  
19 thing was that the only information the government had was  
20 here was a young girl in New York who was a fugitive from  
21 justice who had written twelve letters from Moscow to people  
22 throughout the United States, and they were the only leads,  
23 and it raised the big question of what was she doing in Moscow?

24 Mr. Wallach. Did he ask you if you passed this information  
25 on to the Bureau?

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1 Mr. Angleton. I think I told him. I mean I am certain I  
2 told him. I mean, after all, it was the Department of Justice.

3 Mr. Wallach. Did he ask you if the Bureau had some of  
4 the programs?

5 I take it you told him this mail had been gotten from the  
6 New York intercept operation.

7 Mr. Angleton. I think so. I mean, there was no reason  
8 to hold anything back from him. You know, he was there and the  
9 problems we were discussing got down into this whole question  
10 of -- I mean, let me put it to you another way.

11 Going back into the difficulties we had in the liaison  
12 was interrupted. We then had eventually Mr. Gray come aboard,  
13 and so it raised questions of whether we would be able to resolve  
14 with Mr. Gray during his tenure a number of these outstanding  
15 matters which had sort of hung fire over a long period of time  
16 after Mr. Hoover's death, and before. So just as we thought we  
17 were getting along all right and setting the stage for a number  
18 of meetings with Mr. Gray, then he disappeared, and along came  
19 Mr. Ruckelshaus, and he didn't stay very long. In other words,  
20 there was a whole series of very urgent business in the pending  
21 box that never got out of the pending box, given the changes in  
22 the FBI.

23 Mr. Wallach. Did it strike you as funny then, on June  
24 3rd, when Mr. Helms said he had briefed Mr. Mitchell about the  
25 project, that Mr. Helms didn't say why, I know you did, too?

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1 Mr. Angleton. No. This could be an entirely separate  
2 meeting that he had.

3 Mr. Wallach. But I'm saying if you had briefed Mr. Mitchell  
4 before --

5 Mr. Angleton. I know, but I briefed -- the mail intercept  
6 was only a small part of our discussions. I mean, the contents  
7 of the letters which he saw relating to mail intercepts.

8 Mr. Wallach. But in any event, this developing series  
9 of documents that we have would suggest that Mr. Cotter had  
10 asked that either the Attorney General or the Postmaster General  
11 be briefed by Mr. Helms, and he wanted that to protect his  
12 back, so to speak, and Mr. Helms had concurred because for  
13 whatever reasons, he went ahead and did it, and it seems funny  
14 that Mr. Mitchell wouldn't have said I knew, and he would have  
15 come back to the meeting and said, Jim, I'm glad you briefed  
16 him, that type of thing.

17 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't think it was in that context.  
18 I think in my discussions with the Attorney General was simply  
19 on substantive cases, but also of discussing the whole problem  
20 of coverage.

21 As I read this, Helms' discussion was prompted by Cotter's  
22 problem.

23 Mr. Wallach. Exactly, but all I'm saying is that Mr.  
24 Helms' purpose, from what I can see from these documents and  
25 from talking to him, is going over there and letting Mr. Mitchell

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1 know that there is a project going on in New York.

2 Mr. Angleton. That's true.

3 Mr. Wallach. And even if it wasn't your stated purpose in  
4 going to see him before that, at least he was made aware of that,  
5 from your testimony, now, and just didn't it strike you as  
6 curious?

7 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but I cannot remember the exact date  
8 when we had the meeting with Mitchell.

9 Mr. Wallach. It might have been after this?

10 Mr. Angleton. That is what is bothering me.

11 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you might have known that  
12 Helms talked to him and that it was okay for you --

13 Mr. Angleton. No. I had every intention to brief him.

14 Mr. Wallach. Do you remember Helms at this meeting coming  
15 in and saying I showed Blount a sample of the product and  
16 described the operation to him?

17 Mr. Angleton. Vaguely.

18 Mr. Wallach. Does this Paragraph 3 accord with your  
19 recollection, basically, or does it accord with your recollection?

20 Mr. Angleton. I tell you very frankly I can't seem to  
21 focus on this.

22 Mr. Wallach. Well, in any event, I want to ask you to read  
23 through it now, but you said you did have a vague recollection  
24 of that.

25 Just a couple more questions, Mr. Angleton.

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1 Mr. Angleton. I do remember the latter part of all of  
2 this.

3 Mr. Wallach. You mean the idea of stopping first and investi-  
4 gating later?

5 Mr. Angleton. No, the whole -- yes, that part in the  
6 Paragraph 6, and 7 in particular.

7 Mr. Wallach. Okay.

8 Okay, turning your attention for one second to your  
9 NA cover of Mr. Johnson, I won't belabor it, especially the report  
10 of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence, which was  
11 eventually signed by Mr. Hoover, Mr. Helms, Mr. Bennett and  
12 Mr. Gaylor, Mr. Helms has told us that you primarily worked on  
13 this from the CIA standpoint, is that correct?

14 Mr. Angleton. I was the Agency's representative in the  
15 working group.

16 Mr. Wallach. In Part 2, sir, which is restraints on  
17 intelligence collection, it states, "The Committee noted  
18 that the President had made it clear that he desired full  
19 consideration be given to any regulations, policies or procedures  
20 which tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelligence  
21 collection. The Committee further noted that the President  
22 wanted the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth  
23 so that the President will be able to decide whether or not  
24 the change in current policies, practices, or procedures should  
25 be made."

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1 And then going down and talking about specific operational  
2 restraints, Subsection (c) is mail coverage, there is a  
3 discussion and the document will speak for itself on page 29,  
4 30, etc., and I don't want to read it again into the record,  
5 between legal and illegal mail coverage under the present state  
6 of the law, and illegal mail coverage is defined as opening  
7 mail.

8 In here it states that covert coverage has been discontinued  
9 while routine coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth  
10 of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage  
11 during legal proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in  
12 Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental  
13 invasion of privacy.

14 Did you actually participate in the drafting of this  
15 report?

16 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't think that, as I recall, we  
17 didn't do any drafting.

18 Mr. Wallach. Was it Mr. Sullivan?

19 Mr. Angleton. Everybody submitted, my recollection is  
20 that everybody submitted their own input. The Bureau went off  
21 and came back with drafts, which were then discussed, and then  
22 they went off and the procedure was that. I had Ober present  
23 as my leg man, getting papers and all that, and it's possible  
24 that he may have had something to do with dealing with the  
25 Bureau people who were handling the drafting.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this.

2 Did you read the report before it was signed by Mr. Helms?

3 Mr. Angleton. I read the report.

4 Mr. Wallach. Do you know why there's a statement in there  
5 to the President that covert coverage, which is defined as the  
6 opening of mail, has been discontinued?

7 Mr. Angleton. I think that was mainly a Bureau contribu-  
8 tion.

9 Mr. Wallach. If it was mainly a Bureau contribution, the  
10 Bureau states in a note here the FBI is opposed to implementing  
11 any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal, and it  
12 is likely that if done information will leak out of the Post  
13 Office to the press, and serious damage will be done to the  
14 intelligence community.

15 Mr. Angleton. That is the comment made after the report  
16 was submitted.

17 Mr. Wallach. There was comment made after the report was  
18 submitted?

19 Mr. Angleton. It was not a comment made, to my knowledge,  
20 to the working group, was it?

21 Mr. Wallach. I don't know, but it appears to be part of  
22 the regular type -- report that was signed as a footnote, to  
23 go in.

24 Mr. Angleton. I don't know, but if I recall, the report  
25 was pulled together and finalized, and Mr. Hoover put his

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1 objections.

2 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Angleton, without quibbling about footnotes,  
3 it seems that in any event the Bureau was not pushing for the  
4 implementation of covert mail coverage.

5 But in any event --

6 Mr. Angleton. That was after, that was the position of  
7 Mr. Hoover's which did not jive with Mr. Sullivan, who was the  
8 Chairman of the working group.

9 Mr. Wallach. So, what you're saying is the fact that it's  
10 written here, covert coverage has been discontinued, referred  
11 only to the FBI?

12 Mr. Angleton. No. I'm referring only to the footnote.

13 Mr. Wallach. I know, but I'd like to -- I understand the  
14 explanation. I believe you're correct, in fact, I know you  
15 are correct, but what I'm asking is that the President here is  
16 asking what cannot we do and what haven't we been able to do  
17 because of the laws as they exist, and here you are saying we  
18 cannot do covert coverage because it is illegal, but yet, on  
19 the other hand, covert coverage was going on, at least in  
20 San Francisco and at least in New York.

21 Mr. Angleton. But not known to the other parties in the  
22 working group.

23 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Sullivan knew, didn't he?

24 Mr. Angleton. Yes, but he was the only one.

25 Mr. Wallach. But then would not this be a misrepresentation

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1 to the President unless he knew?

2 Mr. Angleton. Well, it was a question that was asked me.

3 Mr. Wallach. Asked you by whom?

4 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Johnson.

5 Mr. Wallach. Well, I'm sorry --

6 Mr. Angleton. Well, I'm going to -- may I look at that a  
7 moment, because there's something that escaped my attention.

8 Mr. Wallach. Surely.

9 I think any light you can shed on this would be useful.  
10 It's just, I don't think anybody --

11 Mr. Angleton. You see, the basic -- the Bureau presided  
12 over all of these proceedings. The other representatives outside  
13 of ourselves were unaware of our mail coverage, and therefore  
14 it is my understanding -- let me see -- that as far as I know,  
15 we did not spell out to anyone present about what we were  
16 doing. So it stood to reason, except when you come down to  
17 page 30, and this is where I've got to get together with Mr.  
18 Ober, it comes down to covert coverage. It states, high  
19 level postal authorities have in the past provided complete  
20 cooperation and maintained full security of this program.

21 Now, this is -- what I can't understand is whether this  
22 is referring to LINGUAL, because only high postal authorities  
23 knew of its existence, and persons involved are highly trained,  
24 etc.

25 Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. Mitchell ever tell you that he told

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1 the President about the mail operation in New York and the  
2 results, locating <sup>Boudin</sup> Boudien?

3 Mr. Angleton. No. But when I saw him, and Helms said  
4 that he picked and chose, as he saw fit, to brief the President.

5 Mr. Wallach. But at least you agree that this document  
6 appears, on reading, to be -- I'm not saying anyone was trying  
7 to mislead the President, but it's just not clear, in any event.  
8 If you read that document on mail coverage, it appears that  
9 mail was discontinued, covert mail coverage, i.e., opening of  
10 mail. And you're asking for Presidential permission to do it  
11 again.

12 Mr. Angleton. The only point being, if you're going into  
13 this, it gets back into, know of its existence. It is in the  
14 present tense. Only high echelon Postal Authorities know of  
15 its existence.

16 Mr. Wallach. Of the existence of the technique of covert  
17 mail coverage. I don't think there's any suggestion there that  
18 that is a program that is ongoing, if you look at the precedents.

19 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean, I got that.

20 Mr. Wallach. It says "High level Postal authorities have  
21 in the past provided complete cooperation," and it goes on to  
22 say that the technique involves negligible risk.

23 Mr. Angleton. Well, this must be entirely Bureau input  
24 dealing with what they had in the past.

25 Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't want to --

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1 Mr. Angleton. All I can say is that it must be their  
2 input into the exercise because it is going into diplomatic  
3 establishments.

4 Mr. Wallach. And it's not this example, I realize the  
5 bottom part of this is not clear.

6 Mr. Angleton. That would be a Bureau case.

7 Mr. Wallach. That was a Bureau case?

8 (Pause)

9 Mr. Angleton. I have a feeling it is a Bureau case.

10 I don't know. I mean, that's where I have to get clarifi-  
11 cation from Ober because I can't really --

12 Mr. Wallach. In any event, just upon my reading --

13 Mr. Angleton. My reading of the recommendation being put  
14 in the way it was put in. It was simply one of saving or with-  
15 holding from the other participants the actualities. We had  
16 the Army participant, made very clear to us on more than one  
17 occasion that he couldn't even safeguard the documents, that he  
18 couldn't even trust the typists, etc. He didn't even know how  
19 it was going to go through channels, to present it at high  
20 enough levels in the Department of Defense to have it approved.

21 So, if you're running into that type of thing throughout  
22 these meetings, this was a bald statement made of the security  
23 situation in DIA.

24 Mr. Wallach. Who was the Army representative that actually  
25 was there?

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1 Mr. Angleton. A Colonel whose name I know -- well, I've  
2 forgotten it for the moment, but Johnson has it.

3 Mr. Wallach. Well, I don't want to press this point --

4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean I want to try to find out  
5 more but I don't know where I'm going to go to find it out, but  
6 I think that was a Bureau input.

7 Mr. Wallach. Well, was there any discussion about saying,  
8 well, we'll deceive these agencies but we've got to let the  
9 President know the reason we're doing this?

10 Mr. Angleton. Well, there were discussions between  
11 Sullivan and myself and so on, and there's no memo of records  
12 on it. I mean, they were just things about before he went in,  
13 or he called me after a meeting or something of that sort.

14 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall discussions specifically along  
15 those lines, as you said before, we cannot let these other  
16 guys know about it, but we're going to put this in here,  
17 shouldn't we let the President know?

18 Mr. Angleton. It would have stood to reason that we would  
19 have made some comment of that sort when on the Agenda, of  
20 course, of mail intercepts.

21 But you see, there was a great deal about these meetings,  
22 and I'd like to go off the record on this.

23 (Discussion off the record.)

24 Mr. Wallach. If we can go back on the record, going back  
25 to what we discussed before we went off the record, Mr.

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1 Angleton, would it have been your position that you would rather  
2 not have informed the President about this rather than prejudice  
3 the program in terms of its value?

4 Mr. Angleton. Not at all.

5 Mr. Wallach. I just wanted to get it clear that what you  
6 were saying was that when the point in time came when it was  
7 laid on the table, that you would have told him in this regard  
8 that the report was incorrect.

9 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

10 Mr. Wallach. One last very quick area, and I don't know  
11 if Mr. Johnson had discussed it with you. If he did, just let  
12 me know.

13 This involves a case, one of the cases, the Didi Freeman  
14 case. I don't know if you recall it.

15 Mr. Angleton. The which one?

16 Mr. Wallach. Didi Freeman, the waitress, and the penetration  
17 of the Bureau?

18 Mr. Angleton. I've heard of it.

19 Mr. Wallach. Have you had any discussions with anyone  
20 about the case?

21 Mr. Angleton. I never heard about it until relatively  
22 recently. I mean I didn't know about it in the past.

23 Mr. Wallach. Who did you discuss it with?

24 Mr. Angleton. I mean, I have known -- am I supposed to have  
25 discussed this case with the Bureau?

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1 Mr. Wallach. I'm sorry, discussed it with the Bureau?

2 Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean, I misunderstood you.

3 Mr. Wallach. No. I asked you if you discussed it with  
4 anyone from the Bureau.

5 My question before I think was --

6 Mr. Angleton. When was the case? When did the case come  
7 out in print or become known?

8 Mr. Wallach. I am not sure exactly when it came out.

9 Mr. Angleton. It was recently. Hasn't it come out in  
10 print someplace?

11 Mr. Wallach. I think it only came out about six months  
12 ago.

13 Mr. Angleton. I don't think I ever knew the case before-  
14 hand. I never knew that case. I mean I have known of cases and  
15 rumors of cases.

16 Mr. Wallach. You know of no instance in respect to that  
17 case, whether the FBI asked the CIA for help to cover it up?

18 Mr. Angleton. I never heard of that case.

19 Mr. Wallach. Okay.

20 I'd like to say once again thank you very much for coming  
21 down. We've spent four hours here and you have been most  
22 cooperative.

23 Mr. Angleton. Well, I haven't been able to help you,  
24 I'm afraid. That's the trouble.

25 Mr. Wallach. Well, there are a couple of areas where the

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1 documents don't speak so loudly.

2 Mr. Angleton. Let me leave it this way, that I will try  
3 to get into this stuff, and particularly if I have a chance to  
4 see Tsikerdanos, and then I'll give you a ring if I've learned  
5 anything that is more pertinent on the questions you asked.

6 Mr. Wallach. If you could really help us, maybe we should  
7 call him in and have you sit in on the meeting with him.

8 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think he's having a difficult time  
9 with it because he was not involved.

10 Mr. Wallach. I understand that.

11 Mr. Angleton. And therefore he's going back into strange  
12 territory on this. But the only way this can properly be done  
13 in my view is to first deal with the various project officers,  
14 and then principally with Mr. Miler who had the day to day  
15 work, and he could probably answer off the top of his head  
16 every question and every detail. He's a very good man on detail.

17 Mr. Wallach. He's still with the Agency?

18 Mr. Angleton. No.

19 Mr. Wallach. He's not?

20 Mr. Angleton. He left with me. He lives in Alexandria,  
21 But I think he's more or less out of town, but he knows fac-  
22 tually all of the ins and outs of the whole thing from the  
23 beginning.

24 Mr. Wallach. Once again, thank you.

25 (Whereupon, at 6:02 o'clock p.m. the interview was concluded.)

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